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The *Catalogue of Women* and the End of the Heroic Age (Hesiod fr. 204.94–103 M-W)

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SUMMARY: The *Catalogue of Women* supplies the crucial link between Hesiodic poetry and heroic epic. The heroic world of archaic poetry cannot be fully understood without it. But the interpretation of fragment 204 M-W, which describes the end of the heroic age, has long been burdened with misleading and unnecessary assumptions. This article challenges three particularly influential ones: that the passage contrasts demigods to "ordinary" mortals; that Zeus only feigns to destroy the demigods; and that [βίοτον κα]ὶ is an acceptable supplement to line 103. My analysis shows that the *Catalogue* does not represent a departure from, but a creative reappropriation of, traditional epic material.

I. INTRODUCTION

ANY DISCUSSION OF ZEUS'S ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT THE END OF THE HEROIC age must prominently feature fragment 204 M-W of the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*.[1] This fascinating text brings together mythic strands otherwise scattered across a wide range of epic poetry. Unfortunately, the relevant lines in the papyrus (95ff.) are faint and lacunose, and their interpretation must marshal the traditions severally preserved by the Homeric, Hesiodic, and cyclical poems. Selecting alternatives and stringing them into a plausible narrative thread compounds the uncertainties and heightens the danger that the final construct does not reflect the original. Two widely received, but, in my view, incorrect, assumptions have proved particularly misleading and call for full-scale reconsideration. The first is that the fragment has three kinds

[1] I use "Hesiod" and "Homer" as shorthand for Hesiodic and Homeric traditional poetry, without assuming the biographical reality of the individuals so named.

of beings in view: gods, demigods, and so-called "ordinary" mortals.[2] The second, that the proper supplement to line 103 is [βίοτον κα]ὶ ἤθεα. On these two depend: the notion that πρ̣[ό]φασιν ὀλέσθαι at 99 means "ostensibly to destroy" (Zeus is resorting to a pretext, using the demigods to hide his plan to do away with "ordinary" mortals, or vice versa)[3]; that Zeus's real intent is to prevent gods (if the τέκνα θεῶν of 101 are divine) from mating with mortals, or the demigods (if human) from mating with "ordinary" mortals (this follows from the supplements to lines 100–1); that the μάκαρες of 102 are heroes, and that lines 102–3 describe their translation to the Isles of the Blest; and, finally, that lines 120–23 feature a duped Apollo who does not understand that Zeus intends (or pretends) to destroy the demigods.

Many of these hypotheses were first broached in the *editio princeps*: Schubart and Wilamowitz 1907: 34 printed [βίοτον κα]ὶ ἤθεα for 103 on the basis of *Op.* 167; they also noted that "[w]enn V. 61 [99 M–W] πρόφασιν μέν richtig erkannt ist, so war das, was das Proömium der Ilias als Willen des Zeus hinstellt, der Untergang der Heroen durch den troischen Krieg, nur Vorwand" (42); they supplied μι[χθῆ]ι after τέκνα θεῶν in 101, noting as preferable among the interpretive options (correctly, I think) that with the Trojan war Zeus intended to prevent further intercourse between mortals and immortals.[4] And they declared "certainly not unthinkable" that a sixth-century poet might

[2] E.g., Schwartz 1960: 419, Stiewe 1963: 8, and, most recently, Most 2008: 57. Pontani 2000: 272n20 illustrates well the impact of the alleged tripartite division on the interpretation of fr. 204. While he accepts the distinction between demigods and "ordinary" mortals, he equates demigods and heroes, apparently without realizing the contradictions in which this involves him (273n22). Just to cite the most egregious: Catullus contains "an invocation to the ἡμίθεοι who happily mingled with the gods as did Peleus with Thetis" (227). So it is indeed: *heroes, salvete, deum genus! o bona matrum / progenies, salvete iter<um, salvete, bonarum!> / vos ego saepe meo vos carmine compellabo. / teque adeo eximie taedis felicibus aucte, / Thessaliae columen Peleu* (Catull. 64.23–26). But Peleus was *not* the son either of a god or a goddess. By the logic of those who accept the tripartite division, he is *not* one of the *heroes ... deum genus.*

[3] An extreme form of this pretext is that Zeus only feigns to destroy the demigods, while in fact translating them to the Isles of the Blest: "They are not really dead" (West 1985: 120). That they would seemingly have to die to get there is overlooked.

[4] Schubart and Wilamowitz 1907: 43: "Am liebsten würde man die eigentliche Absicht des Zeus darin sehen, daß er durch den troischen Krieg dem Verkehre der Götter mit den Menschen, insbesondere der Erzeugung von ἡμίθεοι ein Ende machte, und vielleicht gelingt es anderen, die Verse 61 bis 66 [99–104 M-W] danach herzustellen." This last statement shows that this is *not* the view advanced by their supplements (esp. to 103).

depict Apollo's insight of Zeus's plan as limited. Many of these assumptions have been individually challenged. Thus, in his old *Loeb* volume Evelyn-White 1914 translated πρόφασιν as "declaring that he [i.e., Zeus] would destroy."[5] Stiewe 1963: 10, in turn, thought best to renounce the figure of a partially ignorant Apollo. And Clay 2005 asserted that the μάκαρες are the gods and that the individual lacking insight may be a mortal, Kalkhas or Agamemnon (30n28 and 32–33). But no one has brought all these objections together into a coherent argument; or has disputed the tripartite division into gods, demigods, and "ordinary" mortals; nor has anyone attempted to integrate into a reading of the passage the puzzling sequence of Hermione's "unexpected" birth and the ensuing quarrel among the gods[6]; and little consideration has been given since Merkelbach and West's 1967 edition to alternative supplements for the *lacunae* in lines 100–3.[7]

In this article I will argue that fr. 204 does not stand in radical discontinuity with other archaic poetic traditions. The demigods are identical with the heroes. There is no ontologically distinct "ordinary" humanity coexisting with them. If any distinction is to be drawn between the demigods and the τέκνα of 101, it is one of degrees of separation from an immortal parent.[8] The μάκαρες are the blessed gods, and βίοτος is not an apposite supplement in this connection. Finally, πρόφασιν must be translated in harmony with its use in Homeric epic to mean "avowedly," not "ostensibly." The picture that emerges is one of creative rearrangement of traditional motifs to give salience to Zeus's providence in bringing about the end of the heroic age. Thus the

[5] Cf. Thalmann 1984:105. He raises the question of the tripartite division at 215n56 and judges it valid not only for the *Catalogue* but also for the Homeric poems.

[6] Puzzlement is acknowledged now and again, but no compelling logic has been offered for the narrative sequence. Rather, the text has been emended under the conjecture that, as it stands, it suffers from interpolation or from lines that have been dropped in error. Cf. Stiewe 1963: 12–13 with bibliography.

[7] Even West's [μὴ ὁμοῦ θνητ]οῖσι — μι[νύθ]η̣[ι φά]ο̣ς does little to affect the traditional assumption of a tripartite division of beings. His edition includes no new supplement to 103. The most recent textual apparatus known to me is in Koenen 1994: 28. He makes interesting suggestions for 102 that suit his—I believe incorrect—conviction that lines 102–3 refer to heroes. And his supplement does not fit the traces of the alleged ν that closes the *lacuna* in the papyrus. (Crönert 1907: 611 reported the ν as secure.) Koenen 1994: 27n63 reports that as of the time of his article he had not seen the actual papyrus or a photograph of it.

[8] A difference, therefore, of degree, not kind.

Catalogue receives proper closure and portrays a self-contained heroic era, not unlike the age of the heroes in *Op.* 156–73.[9]

2. THE MEANING OF πρόφασιν

Merkelbach and West's *editio maior* of fr. 204 follows here (with its apparatus), starting with line 94, to which I have appended Most's recent *Loeb* translation.[10]

ἣ τέκεν Ἑρμιόνην καλλίσφυρ[ο]ν ἐν μεγάροισιν
ἄελπτον. πάντες δὲ θεοὶ δίχα θυμὸν ἔθεντο
ἐξ ἔριδος· δὴ γὰρ τότε μήδετο θέσκελα ἔργα
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, †μεῖξαι κατ᾽ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν
τυρβάξας,† ἤδη δὲ γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
πολλὸν ἀϊστῶσαι σ̣π̣ε̣ῦ̣δ̣ε̣, π̣ρ̣[ό]φασιν μὲν ὀλέσθαι[11]
ψυχὰς ἡμιθέω[ν ....]ο̣ι̣σ̣ι̣ βροτοῖσιν[12]
τέκ̣να θεῶν μι[...].[..]ο̣.[ὀφ]θαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶντα,
ἀλλ᾽ οἳ[13] μ[ὲ]ν μάκ̣[α]ρες κ̣[.....]ν̣ ὡς τὸ πάρος περ
χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀν[θ]ρ̣ώπων̣[βίοτον κα]ἰ̣ἴ̆θε᾽ ἔχωσιν
το̣[..]ε̣.ε̣α̣[ἀθα]νάτῳ[ν τε ἰδὲ] θ̣νητῶν ἀνθρώπων
...[ ]κ̣α̣λ ἄλγος ἐπ᾽ ἄλγει
Ζεὺ̣[ς]κ̣[..]ε̣. ἔ̣κερ̣σε

[9] I do not attempt a reading of 124ff. For various suggestions, see West 1961: 134–36, West 1985: 120–21, Marg 1970: 518, Clay 2005: 32–34, and, largely dependent on Clay, Most 2008. Whether 124–28 looks backward or forward, I do not believe these verses to be indispensable to interpret the foregoing. The very fragmentary lines that follow 132 have only originated airy conjectures, fascinating but unlikely to reflect more than the scholar's ingenuity.

[10] Most 2007 follows Merkelbach and West's Greek text except for lines 104–6, which he prints thus: τῶ̃[ι θ]ῆ̣[κ᾽]{ε} ἀθα]νάτῳ[ν τε ἰδὲ] θ̣νητῶν ἀνθρώπων / ἀργαλέον πόλεμον· τοῖς μὲν τ]ε̣ῦ̣χ᾽ ἄλγος ἐπ᾽ ἄλγει{ν} / Ζεὺ̣[ς]κ̣[..]ε̣. ἔ̣κερ̣σε.

[11] Rzach emended this to ὀλέσσαι. The sense is not affected. There is latitude in reconstructing Zeus's actual words, reported by the fragment here; e.g., the infinitive may be of result or purpose. Then, the middle is rendered, "avowedly [so/in order] that the souls of the demigods perish." Given the context, "avowedly to destroy the souls" accurately conveys the sense, irrespective of the voice adopted. So, Most 2007 ad loc. reads "to destroy the lives," even though he prints ὀλέσθαι. To bring out the underlying fact of Zeus's purpose, I will usually translate "to destroy the souls," rather than the contextually equivalent "for the souls to perish." The grounds for this translation are presented below.

[12] I have added the final ν, which is present in the papyrus and printed by Rzach and the first editors. I do not know why Merkelbach and West have failed to print it. Stiewe 1963: 2 missed it too.

[13] For reasons that will grow clear below, I will henceforth be using the proclitic form οἱ appropriate to the article.

96 τογε *Π* || 97–98 nisi fallimur aut μεῖξαι (glossema) aliud verbum oblitteravit, ut πόλεμον vel γενεὰς (scripto olim seu μείξας seu τυρβάξαι), aut τυρβάξας nomen celat quale τυρβασίας (Rzach) vel *τυρβάζας || 99 ὀλέσσαι Rzach || 100–1 [μὴ ὁμοῦ θνητ]οῖσι — μι[νύθ]η[ι φά]ος West (θνητ]οῖσι Kretschmer) : [μὴ ἐπιχθονί]οισι vel [ἵνα μὴ δειλ]οῖσι et μι[χθῆ]ι [μόρον Wil. (μι[γέη]ι Rzach) || 102 si κ[αὶ ἐς ὕστερο]ν (Rzach), puta verbum ἐς omissum esse in *Π* 104 τῷ̣[ι Allen; τῆλε μάλ' non legi potest ἀθα]νάτῳ [ν Evelyn-White τε ἰδὲ West

She bore beautiful-ankled Hermione in the halls,
unexpectedly. All the gods were divided in spirit
in strife. For high-thundering Zeus was devising
wondrous deeds then, to stir up trouble on the boundless earth;
for he was already eager to annihilate most of the race
of speech-endowed human beings, a pretext to destroy
the lives of the semi-gods, [ ] to mortals
children of the gods [ ] seeing with eyes,
but that the ones blessed [ ] as before
apart from human beings should have [life and] habitations.
Hence he established] for immortals and for mortal human beings
difficult warfare: for the ones he made] pain upon pain
Zeus [ ] he destroyed

The key interpretive point is whether Zeus intends the destruction of the demigods (who, I claim, are the same as the heroes). Either way, the outcome is their removal from the world, and this raises the question of Zeus's aim. The argument here hinges on the meaning of πρόφασιν at 99 and on its syntactic function.

The semantic discussion is complex and the bibliography voluminous, given Thoukydides' use of it at 1.23.6 (ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν).[14] The instances at *Il.* 19.262 and 302 show that the term was current in archaic poetry and that it was commonly used as an adverbial accusative.[15] In the first pas-

[14] Cf. Rawlings 1975 with Robert 1976, L. Edmunds 1977, and S. T. Edmunds 1977. Important articles are Pearson 1952, Pearson 1972, and Pearson 1986; see, further, Nikitas 1976, Heubeck 1980, Rhodes 1987: 159, and García González and Campos Daroca 1987. I do not think that much can be got from the etymology: a spatial προ- with φάσις either from φημί or φαίνω (both of which are possible, and both of which ultimately derive from a common root, $^{*}bheh_2$-; cf. *LIV* 68–69) would amount to the same, "to show forth" or "to state publicly." Cf. LSJ s.vv. ἀποφαίνω II and ἀπόφημι I. *LfrgE* s.v. derives it from προφαίνω. (The following are found in epic: πρόσφημι, ἔκφημι, παράφημι and πάρφασις or παραίφασις, and ἀμφασίη.) Heubeck 1980: 224 champions its derivation from προφάναι and translates, "nach außen hin, vor anderen etwas sagen, in der Öffentlichkeit angeben."

[15] Cf. ἐπίκλησιν and Chantraine 1997 [1953], 2, §57; ἐπώνυμον at *Il.* 9.562 may also be construed as an adverbial accusative (cf. *LfrgE* s.v. B.1).

sage Agamemnon assures Akhilleus that he has not laid hands on Briseis οὔτ' εὐνῆς πρόφασιν κεχρημένος οὔτέ τευ ἄλλου. The verb κεχρημένος takes the dative when it means "to use" or "to enjoy [the use of]"; the genitive, when it means "to seek" and "to want" (both as "to desire" and "to lack"). πρόφασιν may be construed absolutely, as at 302, or, as it seems to be the case here, with a dependent genitive (cf. χάριν at *Il.* 15.744). At any rate, key is that πρόφασιν denotes a public statement, a reason tendered. Only the context determines if the statement is a true reason or a false pretext. The word itself does not prejudge the matter, but what it does not express is a *hidden* motivation that remains known only to the actor.[16] If we assume the ellipsis of αὐτῆς for Briseis and a πρόφασιν + genitive, Agamemnon would be claiming, "I never laid hands on her, neither seeking [her] on the express grounds of sexual intercourse nor of anything else." Agamemnon does not simply aver "neither seeking her for sex nor anything else." He emphasizes what he might have *said* as his reason to touch Briseis, disavowing a self-justification that, though reasonable and irreproachable in normal circumstances (*Il.* 19.176–77), would still offend Akhilleus and injure his pride (*Il.* 9.335–37). Thus, Agamemnon professes deliberate restraint and sensitivity to the problematic status of Briseis as his captive.[17]

The second Homeric occurrence concerns the mourning of Patroklos. After Briseis's lament the poet adds: ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες / Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν, σφῶν δ' αὐτῶν κήδε' ἑκάστη. Here, πρόφασιν stands alone: "the women grieved too, overtly for Patroklos, and, individually, their own sor-

[16] The *verbal* nature of πρόφασις comes across clearly in Rawlings 1975: 23. Note the illuminating examples from Theognis, where it is opposed to κώτιλλε (1.363) and διαβολίῃ (1.324). One of the anonymous reviewers suggests construing πρόφασιν absolutely, as the only explicit oath-word in Agamemnon's oath (cf. ἐπίορκον in 260 and 264). If so, κεχρημένος would take εὐνῆς and τευ ἄλλου, and πρόφασιν may be rendered parenthetically as "on oath" (i.e., "I swear").

[17] Cf. *Il.* 9.336–37. Apparently construing κεχρημένος with εὐνῆς and τευ ἄλλου and taking πρόφασιν absolutely (cf. previous note), *LfgrE* s.v. translates: "(ich schwöre,) dass ich das Mädchen Bris. nicht angetastet u. von ihr, wie jeder merken konnte, weder das Bett noch sonst etwas verlangt habe." The choice of "merken" seems dictated by wedding its meaning to a narrowly interpreted προφαίνω that denotes *non-verbal* display. But this cannot be right; for how could everyone have *marked* this, unless Agamemnon's sexual activities were the object of broad public knowledge? The absurdity of the alleged oath becomes clear if we render the German into its equivalent English: "I obviously never demanded from her the bed." One might say, "I was obviously sick," meaning "everyone could see I was sick"; but it is entirely another thing to say, "I was obviously faithful to my wife": how could this sort of thing be the object of general survey?

rows." Note that "their own sorrows" is not opposed to "Patroklos" as a true reason is to a pretext. Genuine sorrow for Patroklos is mingled with private grief in what is a poignant and realistic portrayal of human psychology. This is what Briseis herself has done by joining Patroklos's death to the prior loss of her husband and her three brothers. That στενάχω may be used of verbal expression and does not simply denote inarticulate moaning can be shown from its uses in *Il.* 24. At the lament for Hektor we meet with singers who led the θρῆνοι: they sang the dirge, a song full of moaning (στονόεσσαν), and the women added their laments (στενάχοντο).[18] Clearly an antiphonal dirge is in view, the men leading and the women answering. στενάχω is used not to suggest inarticulate moaning, but to emphasize that their expressions of grief, like the song of the male ἀοιδοί, are full of moaning. Even γόος, a word often understood as mere weeping and inarticulate wailing, is used to introduce the laments of Andromakhe, Hekabe, and Helen.[19] Any remaining doubts that στενάχοντο may be propositional are dispelled by the coordinate use of verbs that unequivocally denote articulate speech.[20] Therefore, like Briseis, the women of *Il.* 19.301–2 are giving articulate expression to their griefs, tendering Patroklos as their common reason for wailing, to which each adds her own individual losses.[21]

In Hes. fr. 204, the verb ὀλέσθαι most likely depends on σπεῦδε and is parallel to ἀϊστῶσαι[22] (unless σπεῦδε be rejected and the infinitives construed epexegetically with θέσκελα ἔργα).[23] πρόφασιν qualifies ὀλέσθαι adverbi-

[18] *Il.* 24.721–22.

[19] *Il.* 24.723, 747, and 761. "The γόοι are personal lamentations uttered by the next of kin, and are delivered *in speech* ... Both γόοι and θρῆνοι represent a marked *form of speech*" (Tsagalis 2004: 5, my emphasis).

[20] E.g., *Il.* 1.364, 4.153, 18.323.

[21] Here the *LfrgE* establishes a false opposition between a *visible* Patroklos ("die Frauen klagten, wie jeder merken konnte, [in öffentl. Ritus] um Patr.") and the *hidden* individual griefs ("u. [zugleich, was nicht öffentl. zu merken war, auch] eine jede um ihre jeweils eigenen Toten"). In so doing, the author of the entry overlooks what Briseis has just done and forgets that, as a social occasion, Greek laments are verbal rituals analogous (or identical) to songs. The parallel offered, *Il.* 19.339–40, only serves to make my point: Akhilleus mourns Patroklos, remembering those he has left behind, his father and his son. "So he spoke weeping, and the elders added their laments, mentioning (μνησάμενοι) what each had left at home." There is no reason to think that these are silent recollections. The verb fits precisely what Akhilleus has just done: he has verbally recalled what he left at home. To his, the elders are said to add their own words of lamentation.

[22] Cf. *LfgrE* s.v. σπεύδω B (column 183, ll. 14–15).

[23] Schubart and Wilamowitz 1907: 34: "ọ kann auch Interpunktion gewesen sein, ṭ auch τ, ẹ auch ω: die Lesung τωδε is also denkbar." And they add: "σπεύδειν mit Infinitivobjekt noch nicht homerisch." But it is so used at *Op.* 22 and 673.

ally; the μέν of 99 calls for a contrast between what Zeus said and what he intended.[24] But this does *not* imply that the destruction of the demigods is a pretext; only, that it is not Zeus's ultimate purpose. He says one thing, "ψυχαὶ ἡμιθέων ἀπολοῦνται,"[25] and indeed he brings this about; but he does not articulate his ultimate purpose. μέν is answered by ἀλλά in 102 (ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν μάκαρες), a common use recognized by Denniston 1950: 5–6.

3. "ORDINARY" MORTALS?

But before examining 102–3, I must consider the meaning of 100–1 and its possible supplements. My starting point is to reject the notion that the βροτοῖσι who close 100 are "ordinary" mortals, whom the poet contrasts with the τέκνα of 101. I argue at length against this below. My view, if right, does not commend the δειλοῖσι of Wilamowitz. The μι[that follows θεῶν places strong constraints on allowable supplements: for sense, Rzach's μι[γέη]ι is as good as Wilamowitz's μι[χθῆ]ι, except that the uncontracted form is not found in epic[26]; *ceteris paribus*, then, μιχθῆι is to be preferred. As to what should be substituted for ἵνα μὴ δειλοῖσι, Wilamowitz's μὴ ἐπιχθονίοισι (after line 90) works well. Even so, retaining ἵνα is preferable, because it facilitates the subjunctive ἔχωσιν at 103.[27] So, e.g., ἵνα μὴ θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι.[28] ἔχωσιν without a final conjunction is possible, although the resulting grammar is less typical.

[24] There is always the possibility that an epic μέν is only a less emphatic μήν and does not call for a balancing δέ *vel sim.* (Denniston 1950: 359). This may be the case at 102, although given the fragmentary nature of the text one cannot rule out a balancing clause in 104ff.

[25] Or "ψυχὰς ἡμιθέων ὀλέσω," if we accept Rzach's emendation ὀλέσσαι. As noted above, there is latitude in reconstructing the actual words of Zeus. In any case, from the point of view of syntax, the fragment is not a straightforward specimen of indirect speech. Otherwise, it would ordinarily call for a future infinitive, not an aorist. But πρόφασιν does not follow the syntax of εἶπεν. Besides, Zeus need not have said, "the souls will perish." Instead, he could have said, "I will annihilate the race of mortals, [so/in order] that the souls of the demigods perish." And *oratio obliqua* would preserve the aorist infinitive of the subordinate clause. Archaic Greek, moreover, uses the aorist (or present) infinitive, not the future, to express fitness, obligation, necessity *vel sim.* (see Monro 1992 [1882], §238). So Zeus's announcement could have taken the form φρονέω ψυχὰς ἡμιθέων ὀλέσθαι (cf., e.g., *Il.* 3.98 and 13.665–67).

[26] μιγῆῃς and μιγέωσιν are.

[27] Negative final clauses are often introduced by μὴ alone; cf. Chantraine 1997 [1953], 2, §§343 and 397.

[28] See *Hymn. Hom. Ap.* 69; *Hymn. Hom.* 7.20; *Od.* 3.3, 7.210, 12.386; *Theog.* 223, 500 (cf. 903).

Thus, we may consider 102–3 as the thought of Zeus, notionally parallel to the pronouncement implicit in πρόφασιν.[29] Zeus's decree was: "the demigods will perish ...; but the gods will keep."[30] The former clause, he spoke out; the latter, he kept to himself. The audience now "overhears" these thoughts: ἔχωσιν, a prospective subjunctive,[31] amounts to a final clause.[32] Alternatively, it is not unthinkable that there is inconcinnity in the grammar: since notionally μὴ is equivalent to ἵνα μὴ, perhaps ἔχωσιν follows a notional ἵνα, as if μὴ ... μιχθῆι had been ἵνα μὴ ... μιχθῆι.

Before we can choose a proper supplement to precede ὀφθαλμοῖσιν, we need to determine the identity of the τέκνα θεῶν of 101: whether they are themselves gods (i.e., *divine* sons of the gods) or demigods. This identification is complicated by the assumption that there are three groups in view: "ordinary" mortals, demigods, and gods. This is a late tripartite division famously formulated by Theophrastos,[33] but one that has little support in archaic poetry.[34] All the same, many scholars have embraced it. Cerutti 1998: 136 calls it the interpretation of Koenen and West,[35] who refer the motif of separation to the heroes who "trasferiti nelle isole dei beati sarebbero così vissuti separati dai comuni mortali." She too is in sympathy with this view: "Inoltre la razza eroica non è dipinta come tale da albergare—anche se propriamente non la esclude esplicitamente—anche l'umanità comune, non

[29] I write "the thought," not "the words," because he only articulates the end of the demigods. The gods do not hear verses 102–3 (whether they hear the words after ἡμιθέων in 100–1 is immaterial). Only the narrator is privy to 102–3 and reveals them to us.

[30] This translation is purposefully incomplete, offered only to illustrate the grammatical point. The meaning of ἔχωσιν is discussed below.

[31] Cf. Schwyzer 1939–94: 2.310, Palmer 1962: 150–51, and Monro 1992 [1882], §275. A modal κεν, whose presence is regular but not absolutely required, may be supplied in the place of κ̣[αὶ: κ̣[εν ἐς ὕστερο]ν̣. Its placement, however, is difficult. *Od.* 12.83–84, 16.237–38, and 23.218–19 show that the resulting separation from the verb is not an obstacle. *Il.* 2.128, 7.456, and 8.24 (among others) confirm that it may follow adjectives and nouns. The primary hurdle is its very strong tendency to occupy the second position in its clause (or third, when following particles like μέν, δέ, γάρ, or νύ; but cf. *Op.* 357). In this case, I would have expected ἀλλά κεν οἱ μάκαρες καὶ ἐς ὕστερον, etc.

[32] Cf. Chantraine 1997 [1953], 2, §343.

[33] Cf. Diomedes in *Gramm. Lat.* 1.484 Keil.

[34] Pindar's *Ol.* 2.2 offers an early classical instance: τίνα θεόν, τίν' ἥρωα, τίνα δ' ἄνδρα κελαδήσομεν; As lines 3–7 show, the tripartition is designed to join present-day Theron as ἄνδρα with the presiding god, Zeus, and the founding hero, Herakles, of the Olympic games.

[35] See Koenen 1994 and West 1985.

eroica, che invece ... convive con gli eroi" (138–39). But the joint testimony of Homeric and Hesiodic poetry makes the retrojection of this thought into archaic poetry untenable. There is not a hint that anyone but heroes fight at Troy. Distinctions of rank, valor, wealth, and nobility of descent do exist; but nowhere do we find any support for the notion that a subset of the fighters are heroes and the rest, mere mortals. Although diachronically valid and rooted in cult, this contrast is synchronically *invalid* for archaic narrative. Thus, at the invocation that precedes the *Catalogue of Ships*, where the entire Akhaian contingent is in view and where, if anywhere, we might expect a categorial breakdown, we read: "Tell me ... who were the leaders and lords of the Danaans (ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι). But the multitude (πληθύν) I could not tell or name" (*Il.* 2.484–88). And in *Iliad* 12, recounting Poseidon and Apollo's destruction of the Akhaian wall, the narrator, as if looking back on an age long past, observes that they brought against it the force of all of Ida's rivers, including the Skamandros and Simoeis, "where many shields of bull's hide and many helmets fell in the dust, and the race of demigod men (ἡμιθέων γένος ἀνδρῶν)" (21–23). Urging courage in battle, Sarpedon rehearses with Glaukos their royal privileges: "Glaukos, why are we two held in special honor ... in Lykia, and all look on us as on gods?" (*Il.* 12.310–12). This would seem an ideal opening to mark themselves out as ruling demigods vis-à-vis their "ordinary" mortal subjects. Not so; deeds of courage legitimize their prerogatives: "Therefore now we must stand among the foremost Lykians and confront blazing battle, so that any of the mail-clad Lykians speak thus, 'surely not without *kleos* do our *basileis* rule in Lykia ...; their might is noble (ἴις ἐσθλή), since they fight among the foremost Lykians'" (315–21).[36] The grand bargain of life-for-*kleos* finds its logic in the common mortality that demigods emphatically share: "for in any case countless fates of death (κῆρες) stand facing us, which no mortal (βροτόν) may escape or avoid" (326–27).[37] What distinction could then be made to mark out heroes from an alleged contingent of "ordinary" mortals, when the overriding attribute of all men living is their mortality, pure and simple?

Hesiod, too, views the matter in much the same way as Homer. His heroic age does not include demigod-heroes and "ordinary" mortals; but exclusively and specifically the "divine race of men-heroes, who are called demigods" (*Op.*

[36] If someone objects that, whereas Sarpedon was a demigod, Glaukos was not, I answer that this too makes my point; for *despite* this fact, Sarpedon speaks of himself and Glaukos without distinction.

[37] Cf. Hektor at *Il.* 6.488–89, who distinguishes only between the courageous (noble) and the cowardly (base).

159–60). That the *Works and Days* pronounces them Zeus's workmanship, while the *Catalogue* details the sexual relations between the gods and mortals who conceived them, gives us no license to wedge apart the worldviews of both poetic traditions. An ancient audience that heard *Op.* 158–59 would hardly assume that these heroes had *not* been sired by gods and mortals, and were, rather, the immediate manufacture of Zeus. This simplistic over-reading is unlikely. In the *Works and Days* too the mortality of these demigods is an attribute of overriding interest.[38] And fr. 204.118–19, in profoundly traditional language, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the heroic perspective common to Homer and Hesiod: π]ολλὰς Ἀΐδηι κεφαλὰς ἀπὸ χαλκὸν ἰάψ[ει]ν / ἀν]δ̣ρ̣ῶν ἡ̣ρ̣ώων ἐν δηϊοτῆτι πεσόντων. Hence, only an inadmissible collapse of diachronic and synchronic levels supports the inference that, since today's humanity (for Hesiod, the age of iron) descends from the people of the heroic age but is obviously inferior to them, it cannot be traced to the heroes (demigods) and must stem from heroic-age "ordinary" mortals (not demigods) who survived the conflict. The poets do not explore the cause of our degeneration, and, if I must speculate, the genetic dilution of first-generation heroic blood (i.e., the increasing degrees of separation from a divine progenitor) might fit the silence of the tradition as well as one of loss of discipline, character, and valor. We must remember these observations when we consider below who the τέκνα θεῶν are. For if mating is in view at 101 (not the only possible supplement, as we shall see, but doubtless the most traditional in language

[38] *Op.* 161–[66]. Cerutti 1998: 157 reads like special pleading. Having read into the text of Hes. fr. 204, on the basis of an uncertain reconstruction, a radical break with the traditional worldview of Homeric and Hesiod poetry, she pronounces "inopportune" the attempt to illuminate the fragment with the Myth of the Ages. The burden of proof must surely rest on those who argue the discontinuity, a burden that Cerutti, in her detailed and immensely interesting article, does not sustain. A different kind of question is the one raised by Davies 1992: 97: whether we can assume the world described by the *Catalogue* to be the same in kind throughout, given the broad time-span the poem covers. (The word she uses, perhaps not the happiest, is "static.") If we can trust the outlines of the current arrangement of fragments, I do not see any reason to believe that there is a change in the world that suggests discontinuities from characteristic Homeric and Hesiodic outlooks. Its catastrophic end (by universal war and, perhaps, cataclysm) argues precisely for the opposite. Another matter is that the *Catalogue* may interpolate, so to say, between a theogonic and a heroic outlook (Davies 1992: 101). This movement, from the fantastic to the "ordinary" heroic, is known to us from the *Odyssey*. And Homeric epic presents various degrees of intimacy with the gods that perhaps correspond to what may be a gradual sense of separation between Hes. fr. 1 and the traumatic, final cleavage that fr. 204 narrates. Cf. Schmitt 1975: 21n9 and Bianchi 1988.

heretofore suggested), it is then hardly cogent to claim that what Zeus has in view is preventing the demigods from mating with "ordinary" mortals.

But perhaps someone will argue that fr. 1 of the *Catalogue* establishes the very discontinuity between demigod-heroes and "ordinary" mortals that I am contesting. This is the approach of Clay 2005. I agree with her that the perspective of the *Catalogue* does not fully match the accounts of the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*. She is right to note, like others before her, that fr. 1 paints a picture of communion between gods and men that seems to match "*in some respects* the race of gold" (26, my emphasis).[39] To be sure, this communion has perhaps all too readily been assumed: nothing in *Op.* 109–20 need be taken to signify social intercourse between gods and mortals.[40] And, at all events, as Clay must admit, neither the men of the golden race nor the heroes of the *Catalogue* "are exempt from mortality" (26). So where, and in what terms, is the alleged discontinuity between demigods and "ordinary" mortals established? Her argument in 27–28 makes clear the root of her misconception: an attempt, destined to fail, to harmonize the *Theogony*'s account of Prometheus at Mekone—the "separation" (or "disagreement") between gods and mortals—and the Myth of the Ages[41] in the *Works and Days* (or, in its stead, the separation operative in fr. 204 of the *Catalogue*).[42] Nothing suggests that these three Hesiodic works are composed as a single coherent narrative, which the audience must articulate into a comprehensive mythic sequence. It may be interesting to wonder at what point in its narrative the *Theogony* contemplates humanity's coming into being; it is entirely another matter to assume that the answer to this question must somehow apply to the other

[39] On the myth of the golden age in classical antiquity, see Kubusch 1986.

[40] Cf. Arrighetti 1998: 449. The non-existence of women is also simply asserted (Clay 2005: 27n10). Once again, the fashioning of Pandora and the notion that *all* women come from her is being read into *Op.* 109–20.

[41] I use this traditional label without prejudice to the question of its genre and type of narrative.

[42] Cf. Arrighetti 1998: 449–50. Merkelbach 1968a: 132 is a good example of the results to which harmonization leads: in a reprise of the Biblical "gap theory" of *Genesis*, he posits a post-Promethean cataclysm at the beginning of the *Catalogue*, somewhere after fr. 1, that would take us from the time of communion between gods and mortals to Deukalion as the sole survivor. He then repopulates an earth where separation is now the norm. (Cf. the similar reasoning in Merkelbach 1968b: 144–45.) But this would make the *Catalogue*'s theme of the "best women *at that time*" (τότε) who had sex with the gods (μισγόμεναι θεοῖσιν) oddly peripheral to the poem; for, under this scenario, such sexual relations would be exceptional. This is precisely the lucid point Schmitt 1975: 19–20 makes (cf. 22).

two works. After all, it is widely acknowledged that the Myth of Pandora and the Myth of the Ages in the *Works and Days cannot* be reconciled. Rather, they combine to explain significant features of Hesiod's here-and-now, features he must underscore in pursuit of the aim of his speech.

But the objector may point to frr. 2, 4, and 5 of the *Catalogue*, which make mention of Prometheus, Epimetheus, and Pandora. May he not therefore import into the poem whatever may be gleaned in other sources about their role in humanity's origin? I answer with a question: what precisely do these fragments teach us about the place of these characters in the *Catalogue*? Fr. 2, from the scholia to Apollonios Rhodios, tells us on the authority of "Hesiod in the first book of the *Catalogue*" that Deukalion was the son of Prometheus and Pandora! Is it likely, if harmonization is the goal, that after his warning to Epimetheus, Prometheus would marry Pandora? No wonder Merkelbach and West 1967: 4 remark that "locum funditus corruptum varie sanare conati sunt viri docti." West's own solution is to make Deukalion the son of Prometheus (no mother is mentioned), and to make Pyrrha Deukalion's wife and the daughter of Epimetheus and Pandora. Fr. 4, from the scholia to Homer, tells us that Deukalion, in whose time the deluge took place, "was the son of Prometheus and Klymene (as most say) or Pryneie (so Hesiod) or Hesione (so Akousilaos)"; and that he married Pyrrha and Pandora. West 1985: 50 thinks Pryneie an "unknown and unbelievable name, doubtless corrupt." His dismal verdict seems inescapable: both sources are corrupt, and we are left without a mother for Deukalion. This does not inspire much confidence in the sources and complicates any attempt to read the *Catalogue* as a straightforward sequel to the Prometheus myth. How is Prometheus supposed to have created mankind? Neither the *Theogony* nor the *Works and Days* asserts the fact; rather, they seem to assume that man already exists. Is it legitimate to surmise that, "according to Hesiod," Prometheus is the Titan father of the human race? Might this not be a later inference from Zeus's punishment of humans for what is solely Prometheus's fault?[43] We do not even know with whom he is supposed to have fathered men (if that is how he did it). Most likely fr. 5 makes reference to a younger Pandora, a "girl in the halls of illustrious Deukalion," who is not the Pandora of Hesiodic fame.[44] Only four other fragments mention Deukalion: frr. 3, 6, and 7 say nothing about his origin or anything extraordinary about his descendance; only fr. 234 is

[43] This solidarity in punishment parallels that of ruler and ruled (*Op.* 260–61). Obviously, for Hesiod this need not betoken genealogical ties.

[44] Hirschberger 2004: 172–73.

relevant. It retells the story of the people born from stones: "For Lokros led the Lelegan people, whom once Zeus, son of Kronos, he who knows imperishable counsels, gave to Deukalion, the stones/people gathered from the ground."[45] Merkelbach and West 1967 assign it to the *Catalogue*; Hirschberger 2004: 156 to other *epē* of uncertain provenience.[46] So does Most 2007 in the *Loeb* (as fr. 251). Be that as it may, there is no need, not even if one thinks that it belongs in the *Catalogue*, to assume: that the flood is in view at the beginning of this poem; that Deukalion, as the lone survivor, repopulates the earth by using these stones; and even less that he combined stone-throwing and natural reproduction with Pyrrha. West 1985: 55–56 dismisses the thought that the great flood was alluded to in the *Catalogue*.[47] He also rejects the suggestion that the story of stone-throwing, Pindar's sequel to the flood, must presuppose a cataclysm any more than men from ants for Aiakos or from serpent's teeth for Kadmos do.[48]

The view that the *Catalogue* is the act that followed a universal catastrophe betrays the unsupported imposition upon it of a sequence of discontinuous periods, extracted from the Myth of the Ages. There is not a textual shred on which to ground this move. West is surely right that "the *Catalogue* knows no such scheme" (1985: 56). I cannot accept, then, Clay's strongly worded assumption that the poem sets out from a marked contrast between an "ordinary" humanity and the demigods with one divine parent: Deukalion and Pyrrha (she writes) repopulated the earth by throwing stones that turned into humans; and Pyrrha bore offspring not only to Deukalion but also to Zeus. "This history of the human race thus implies a double origin: one half-divine, a hybrid of mortal, Olympian and Titanic,[49] a heroic strand ... and a second strand, sprung from the earth" (Clay 2005: 28). But this scheme proves too much, for the offspring of Pyrrha and Deukalion would be non-heroic and

[45] ΛΑΟΥΣ puns on λάους and λαούς.

[46] Her commentary is at 478–79.

[47] "[F]irst attested in Epicharmus (P.Oxy. 2427 fr. 1) and Pindar (*Ol.* 9.49ff.)," he notes. Hirschberger 2004: 174 disagrees: "[I]m [*Katalogos* ist] zwar keine Sintfluterzählung erhalten ... aber [sie wird] durch die Nennung von Deukalion und Pyrrha doch zumindest vorausgesetzt ... ." But she has no evidence other than the sheer conjecture that her fr. 6 (= *P.Oxy.* 2822 fr. 1) may cite the deluge because λάβρῳ is often used in connection with weather phenomena that might suit the flood (cf. Hirschberger 2004: 196). On this fragment, see West 1983: 30.

[48] For a different view, cf. Hirschberger 2008: 113–14.

[49] Mortal, because of Pyrrha; Olympian, because of Zeus; Titanic, presumably because Pyrrha descends from Epimetheus and Deukalion from Prometheus.

Titanic; whereas the stones-turned-humans would be neither Titanic nor heroic. Are "ordinary" humans also to be split into two classes?[50]

Hes. fr. 1 gives us yet another reason to reject the distinction between demigods and "ordinary" mortals so often deployed as interpretive key. Verses 8–9 note that mortals (men and women) were not ἰσαίωνες.[51] In his exemplary article, Schmitt 1975: 24–29 systematically considers the possible *comparanda* for the ἴσος of ἰσαίωνες—the gods, the men of Hesiod's day, or the demigods among themselves—and concludes that present men make the only compelling option: "[V]on einer Aussage, die sich mit οὐδ' ἄρα an v. 6–7 anschließt, erwartet man, daß auch in ihr etwas genannt ist, was in irgendeiner Weise den besonderen Vorzug der Menschen der Heroenzeit vor der Gegenwart erklärt" (24). One must bear in mind that, whatever its meaning, this verse must be saying something that motivates (or explains) why gods and men had common δαῖτες and θόωκοι.[52] The meaning of αἰών, however, is not to be restricted to duration of life, but rather denotes its quality, the heroes' bodily strength, a youthful character (note the ἠΐθεοι of 12) that lasted well into old age.[53] This is the sense in which it was characteristic of these heroic men not to give much thought to aging, a sentiment expressed in verse 10 and one that Simonides makes extensive to all who are in the flower of youth (fr. 20.5–8 W). The text of fr. 1 does present two groups, however, both of which must be heroes: the οἳ μὲν δηρόν of 11 and the τοὺς δ' εἶθ[αρ] of 12. The contrast here is between those who, like Nestor, lived for a long time, and those who

[50] The shock-value of referring to the offspring of god and mortal as a "half-human/half-divine hybrid" (Clay 2005: 28) bears little connection to archaic epic thought. No known passage portrays these beings as "hybrid": they are all too human, despite their extraordinary abilities and—as the case might be—outsized personalities, prodigious appetites, or elevated deportment. Precisely because we, as their audience, can relate to them so readily as exponents of the human condition, does archaic epic poetry retain its appeal in our day.

[51] οὐδ' ἄρα ἰσαίωνες ομ[/ ἀνέρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες ε[.

[52] I.e., they "ate together" and "sat together." The *comparandum* cannot be the gods, for drawing this distinction would not tell the audience anything particularly characteristic of the demigods. The audience would have assumed without any telling that the heroes were not immortal. The point, if made, would have been trite. And their respective status as immortal (gods) and mortal (demigods) had *already* been made in the immediately preceding verse 7.

[53] *Il.* 4.310–25 offers an aged Nestor, whose strength is no more what it was in his youth and who therefore spends his time mostly giving advice. But his attitude is still youthful and courageous.

were cut down suddenly in the course of a heroic exploit.[54] The communion between gods and mortals is naturally established by the heroes' "godlike" attributes: these, epic commonly identifies as beauty and strength of body, the marks that αἰών as "vital force" denotes.[55]

What follows from these considerations is that the opening of the *Catalogue* cannot have had in view the tripartite division usually assumed to exist in fr. 204. For if that had been the case, there would be no point in comparing the heroes of yore with today's mortals: rather, the comparison would have been drawn between the alleged two contingents, "ordinary" and "extraordinary" mortals—the former, men like today's, the latter, the demigods of old. As Schmitt 1975: 31 writes, there is a certain disjunction between the promise to sing of mortal women who mated with gods and the comprehensive genealogical scheme the *Catalogue* unveils. For the poem does not merely detail the births and fortunes of the offspring of such relationships. Its tendency is to cover the heroic age in its entirety.[56] This design strongly suggests that the poem considers the entire population of its age as made of heroes or demigods (the two labels used interchangeably), notwithstanding differences arising from the standing of the god (or goddess) who gave rise to a hero's line, the number of generations between him and the divine progenitor, and the fame and accomplishments of his ancestors. All approaches that wedge apart demigods and an alleged "ordinary" humanity depend on the notion that fr. 1 introduces a special kind of being whose constitution is qualitatively different even from that of the most famous of epic heroes: Hektor, Menelaos, and others who have no divine parent. It is not merely the likes of Akhilleus and Aineas who shared δαῖτες and θόωκοι with the gods. These verses describe neither a past antediluvian stage, as a sort of *excursus* that says nothing about the heroic age that follows; nor do they refer to specific heroes, immediate offspring of a divine parent, who are only a fraction of the characters whose genealogy and exploits the *Catalogue* presents. Its opening verses aim to outline for Hesiod's audience the very conditions that obtained throughout the entire heroic age, which made possible the sexual intercourse that became

[54] So Schmitt 1975: 28–29. Cf. *Il.* 11.579 (= 13.412, 17.349). Schmitt 1975: 26–27 explains why this μὲν ... δέ opposition is unlikely to be one between the heroes of old and the men of today.

[55] E.g., *Il.* 24.629–30: ἤτοι Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμος θαύμαζ' Ἀχιλῆα / ὅσσος ἔην οἷός τε· θεοῖσι γὰρ ἄντα ἐΐκει. Also *Il.* 11.60: ἠΐθεόν τ' Ἀκάμαντ' ἐπιείκελον ἀθανάτοισιν. Cf. *Od.* 11.308–10 and 522.

[56] Cf. Arrighetti 2008: 21.

the signature of the era.[57] One must set aside preconceptions about what the ξυναὶ δαῖτες and ξυνοὶ θόωκοι imply—e.g., that common feasts presuppose the absence of cult (sacrifice and the like) or entail a higher degree of intimacy than heroic epic portrays. Instead, one must interpret these words in light of the *Catalogue*'s own narratives. It is demonstrably false, for example, that such intimacy presupposes the absence of cult: the Phaiakians claimed that the gods were physically present at their banquets, and yet they offered hecatombs to them (*Od.* 7.202).

4. THE τέκνα θεῶν AND HERMIONE

It is best, then, to take τέκνα θεῶν to refer to the ἡμίθεοι. The heroic context commends this view, for the alternative would introduce intolerable confusion.[58] Indeed, if it denoted the divine children of the gods, who are these supposed to be, and why are they set apart from their divine parents? What in the context would call for singling out such an unfathomable group, when the talk is of Zeus avowedly destroying the souls of the demigods?[59] Only reading

[57] Schmitt 1975: 31: "[D]iese Verse schweifen dann nicht in irgendeiner Weise vom Thema ab, sondern bilden einen notwendigen und deshalb auch nicht ersetzbaren Teil der Explikation des Themas: Ohne sie bliebe unerklärt, welche ganz anderen Bedingungen einer ganz anderen Welt als der heutigen der Leser ständig sich in Erinnerung halten muß, wenn er die folgenden Geschichten des Katalogs hört."

[58] Koenen 1994: 29n68.

[59] Schwartz 1960: 418n4 wants us to assume that τέκνα θεῶν is a gloss for θεοί that follows readily from "*paides* + genitive" in Homer. But this expression, only at *Od.* 11.547 (παῖδες δὲ Τρώων), is in fact exceptional and has raised suspicions (see Merry and Riddell 1886 ad loc.). On the other hand, the rather common expression υἷες Ἀχαιῶν reflects a historical fact: "Akhaians" does not denote a well-defined ethnicity or the inhabitants of a clearly circumscribed area. Lehmann 1991: 112 notes that the *ethnikon* Ἀχαιϝοί and the toponym Ἀχαΐα are attested primarily in central Greece (southern Thessaly, Lokris) and otherwise (for pre-Doric Mycenaean times) in the Aegean south and southeast: "Jedenfalls läßt sich das Achaeer-Ethnikon mit keinem der großen mykenischen Zentren auf der Peloponnes in konkrete Verbindung bringen" (Lehmann 1985: 52). Contrast the *ethnikon* Δαναοί, which can be traced to the Egyptian *Danaja*/*Tanaja* (*tnjw*) "firmly located in the Argolis" (Lehmann 1991: 109). Although epic poetry instances Ἀργεῖοι, Δαναοί, and Ἀχαιοί—the formulaic system eventually assimilated the last to the former two—it cannot be a coincidence that only Ἀχαιῶν is connected to υἷες. Alternative forms of the nominative plural (υἷες, υἱέες, and υἱεῖς) could have accommodated all three. I submit that this epic usage reflects, however dimly, a historical datum: that the *ethnikon* Ἀχαιοί described the Greeks as a people only in so far as they descended from a prehistorical Akhaian root that, split into various branches, had populated distant areas of ancient Greece of epic significance. The "sons" in "sons of the Akhaians" is strictly motivated by their primary status not as primitive Akhaians but as *descendants* of the Akhaians. (Usage suggests that Τρώων in *Od.* 24.38 be construed directly with ἄριστοι.)

the *Catalogue* passage in the light of *Genesis* 6: 4 can suggest gods who fear lest their divine offspring be tempted to mate with beautiful mortals as they gaze on their beauty.[60] But the author of *Genesis* at least felt the need to mark the beauty of the women explicitly: "the sons of God saw the daughters of men, that they were fair" (6: 2). No such emendation fits in the *lacuna* of 101, and ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶντα by itself is too limp to convey the notion.[61] We must not forget, moreover, that it is the will of Zeus that is in view here, not the will of divine parents generally. One would have to assume that Zeus is concerned about the "children of the gods." Are these supposed to be all gods younger than his own generation? Would anyone surmise that much? I do not think that one can get such a novel notion from his respectful address as the "father of men and gods." This betokens not physical paternity but his role in fashioning and ruling the world.[62] And why would Zeus not be concerned about his coevals? Not to mention that, of all gods, he himself was the most promiscuous with mortal women.[63] The attempts by some to read the Olympian gods into the τέκνα θεῶν is unsatisfactory. Zeus himself would be one such τέκνον. And the interpretation of *Gen.* 6, with its enigmatic "sons of God" and "daughters of men," is far from agreed on. The notion that it describes the intermarriage of angels or gods with mortal women is characteristic of fanciful intertestamental apocalyptic literature. To use it to illuminate Hes. fr. 204 is surely an instance of explaining *obscurum per obscurius.*

The ἡμίθεοι, on the other hand, or at least a subgroup of them, are immediately intelligible as τέκνα θεῶν. This equation is favored by the context and makes narrative sense, for after hearing about πρόφασιν ὀλέσθαι the audience expects a rationale. It may also shine light on the enigmatic ἄελπτον of 95, which describes the birth of Hermione. The parallels from the *Hymn to Demeter* are not apropos, since they regard a woman past childbearing who has every reason *not* to expect a son. But Helen, as scholars note, is young: why should she not expect a child? Although the story is compressed in a way that suggests audience familiarity, it appears that the gods—Zeus, one assumes, first and foremost—had forbidden her to have children.[64] Who was surprised can only

[60] Koenen 1994: 29; cf. Scodel 1982: 42n22.

[61] If it were drawing attention to the visual experience, we would expect at least a deictic, "seeing *them* with their eyes." With its demonstrative τῆς, the aorist ἰδών, and the ingressive aorist ἠράσσατο, Hes. fr. 145.13—in effect "love at sight"—is not a valid parallel and offers no support.

[62] Cf. Burkert 1985: 129, Kirk 1985: 110, and West 1997: 433–34.

[63] Cf. the list of gods that opens the *Catalogue*, Hes. fr. 1.15ff.

[64] Kakridis 1971: 50 notes: "[T]here must be latent an old legend, known also to the poet of the *Odyssey*: the gods forbid Helen to bear children, because they want to keep her exclusively an instrument of voluptuous love."

be guessed. Given the divine prohibition, perhaps Helen was not hoping to conceive; but to her surprise she did.[65] Or perhaps Zeus expected her to abide by the prohibition and was surprised by the birth of the girl, living proof of her mother's disobedience. Some of our sources state that Helen gave birth only to Hermione. Perhaps they are hinting at the prohibition: after her birth the gods did not grant her another ("no more revealed an offspring to her," *Od.* 4.12–14). Other sources gave her more children (e.g., Hes. fr. 175 M–W).[66] But Marg 1970: 510 notes that the *Catalogue* does not usually contradict Homer: "Da die Katalogoi Ilias und Odyssee nicht zu widersprechen pflegen, wird das Fragment [175 M–W] nicht zu ihnen gehören." Thus, we may safely assume that in the *Catalogue*, as in the Homeric tradition, Hermione is an only child; and that fr. 204 seems to exploit her singularity (Helen had no further offspring) to make a point about the relationship of gods to mortals. Did Zeus after Hermione's birth make Helen infertile to ensure her future obedience to his will?[67] The scholiast speculates that the gods wanted to preserve Helen's

[65] Cf. Kakridis 1971: 52–53.

[66] Schol. *Od.* 4.11: οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι Ἑλένης μὲν καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου Κόρυθον ἢ Ἕλενον, ἐκ δὲ Μενελάου Νικόστρατον γενεαλογοῦσι. The term οἱ νεώτεροι may include Hesiodic material. This the scholiast to Sophokles' *Elektra* 539 (Hes. fr. 175 M-W) seems to confirm; for, after noting the disagreement between Homer and the tragedian, he adds that Hesiod agrees with Sophokles (συμφωνεῖ αὐτῷ Ἡσίοδος) and cites two hexameter lines to make the point: ἢ τέκεθ' Ἑρμιόνην δουρικλειτῶι Μενελάωι· / ὁπλότατον δ' ἔτεκεν Νικόστρατον ὄζον Ἄρηος. The first seems a variation of Hes. fr. 204.94. It is possible that the latter belonged in a Hesiodic poem. West 1985: 121 speculates that after fr. 204 the *Catalogue* must have returned to more detailed narrative. It may then have included a mention of the son that Helen bore to Paris (if he knew that tradition) and a mention of the youngest son, Nikostratos. But the scholia D to *Il.* 3.175 (I quote van Thiel's edition) provide little reassurance; for they credit Kinaithon with what the scholiast to Sophokles assigns to Hesiod: λέγει δὲ τὴν Ἑρμιόνην. ὁ δὲ Πορφύριος ἐν τοῖς Ὁμηρικοῖς ζητήμασιν οὕτως φησίν· Ἑλένης τε καὶ Μενελάου ἱστορεῖ Ἀρίαιθος παῖδα Μορράφιον (*FGrH* 316F6), ἀφ' οὗ τὸ τῶν Μορραφίων γένος ἐν Πέρσαις. ὡς δὲ Κιναίθων Νικόστρατον (Cinaetho fr. 3 Bernabé)· παρὰ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις Ἑλένης δύο παῖδες τιμῶνται, Νικόστρατος καὶ Ἀιθιόλας.

[67] Even if this were so, archaic epic does not use the language of medicine. It is not a question whether a woman is infertile or not, but whether the gods' will (as revealed, or declared, to her and hers) is to grant or withhold issue. Thus, it cannot be, as Hirschberger 2004: 416 suggests, that there was a tradition that made Helen infertile, as an objective physiological condition, and that *on that account* Helen was surprised when she conceived Hermione.

beauty (potentially compromised by gestation and birth) in order to entice Paris to abduct her.[68] One might guess that, at the very least, the girl would provide Helen with a disincentive to abandon her home and sail for Troy. In *Il.* 3.175 Helen adds her desertion of the girl to that of bridal chamber, kin, and peers. Her monstrous disregard of proper parental love aggravates her guilt.[69] If Zeus was intent on preventing Helen from having offspring, this may explain the inordinate attention lavished on the suitors' courtship and its complex arrangements. And the fate of Hermione, torn between Orestes and Neoptolemos, might be poetic justice visited on the daughter on account of her infamous mother.[70]

Whatever the truth of these speculations, what I can say with greater certainty is that the birth of the girl, the offspring of an immediate descendant of Zeus with a mortal man, by the enjambment of the attention-getting ἄελπτον, emphatically punctuates the beginning of the end of the heroic age.[71] For Helen bore Hermione, "and all the gods were at variance in strife" (fr. 204.95–96). The impression of immediacy is strong, as if the birth had triggered universal quarrel among the gods (note πάντες, 95). The relationship between these two facts is strengthened by the manuscript reading τό γε at 96, emended in the *editio princeps* to τότε[72] perhaps because its meaning was too bold for the editors; or on the assumption that τό γε unnecessarily duplicates the verse-ending θέσκελα ἔργα. But if τότε, which expresses mere conjunction of time, leaves uncertain whether there is a causal relationship

[68] Schol. *Od.* 4.11: διὰ τί δὲ Ἑλένη μόνην τὴν Ἑρμιόνην ἔτεκε; διότι τὸ πολλάκις τεκεῖν ἀλλοιοῖ τὸ κάλλος τῆς γυναικός. μελλούσης γὰρ αὐτῆς μεσολαβῆσαι εἰς τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Τρώων καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκέτι ἐδίδουν αὐτῇ τέκνον οἱ θεοὶ, ἵνα τὸ κάλλος φυλάττῃ, ᾧ Ἀλέξανδρος ἡδυνθῆναι ἔμελλε.

[69] Apollod. *Epit.* 3.3 notes that Hermione was ἐνναέτης; whether this too is an aggravating factor is not clear.

[70] See Jouan 1966: 162–63. Cf. Gantz 1993: 2.683 and 690–93.

[71] Hirschberger 2004: 416 writes: "Vielleicht kommt es also nicht für Helena, sondern für Zeus unerwartet, daß seine schöne Tochter ein Kind von einem Sterblichen gebiert. In jedem Fall scheint die Geburt Hermiones für ihn der unmittelbare Anlaß zu sein, weitere Verbindungen zwischen Göttern und Menschen zu unterbinden."

[72] Schubart and Wilamowitz 1907: 34: "ΤΟΓΕ, Schreibfehler." Cf. *Il.* 1.120, 3.308 (~ *Od.* 14.119), 5.827 (~ 14.342), 5.853 (~ 11.238), 6.167 (= 6.417, ~ 14.191, 15.212, *Od.* 21.126), 7.281, 17.408, 22.301, 23.332, 24.52; *Od.* 1.370, 16.302, 17.401, 19.283.

between Zeus's will and the ἔρις that rends divine society,[73] τό γε emphatically makes strife the outcome of Zeus's plan[74]:

... πάντες δὲ θεοὶ δίχα θυμὸν ἔθεντο 95
ἐξ ἔριδος· δὴ γὰρ τό γε μήδετο θέσκελα ἔργα
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, νεῖκος[75] κατ᾽ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν
τυρβάξαι.[76]

And all the gods were at variance
in strife; for indeed *this* he was devising, wondrous deeds,
high-thundering Zeus, in order to stir up quarrel on the boundless earth.

Together, the backward-looking τό γε and the forward-looking θέσκελα ἔργα nicely encompass the comprehensive will of Zeus: both the divine ἔρις and the stirring of νεῖκος throughout the earth (with all that ensues) are of his devising. This represents strife in heaven and war on earth, with Zeus as the prime mover. The divine sphere has chronological (if not causal) priority. A helpful parallel that may or may not stand behind these words is the famous beauty contest between Athena, Aphrodite, and Hera. It is doubtless the case that this event engendered divine strife that, at least in the traditions narrated by the *Kypria*, led to the Trojan War. And it is keenly relevant that, according to Proklos, Hermes "at the command of Zeus"[77] led the three goddesses to

[73] Although δὴ γάρ hints that the quarrel follows from μήδετο θέσκελα ἔργα / Ζεύς, the causal link remains vague enough to puzzle commentators: "The *eris* dividing the gods could be either the cause or the effect of Zeus's plan (cf. Marg 1970: 516), but I think the explanatory γάρ suggests the latter" (Clay 2005: 29n23).

[74] It is relatively easy to heal the meaning of the crux at 97–98. I follow Merkelbach and West 1967: 101, who suggest that τυρβάξας be emended to τυρβάξαι and a suitable noun like πόλεμον substituted for μεῖξαι; only that, for sense, I prefer Koenen's νεῖκος to πόλεμον (Koenen 1994: 28). Initially a gloss for the rarer τυρβάξαι, μεῖξαι must have accidentally displaced the object of τυρβάξαι. That μίσγω is used metaphorically or in periphrases for stirring or joining strife/war is clear, among others, from *Il.* 4.456, 13.286, 14.386, 15.510, 21.469, 21.469, 23.687 (cf. *Od.* 5.317, 20.203); Alkaios 330 Lobel; Pind. *Pyth.* 4.213, Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 2.78; Soph. *OC* 1047; and Kallinos 1.11. Rzach's alternative, replacing τυρβάξας by τυρβασίας, does not affect the meaning.

[75] I print Koenen's νεῖκος for μεῖξαι (see previous note).

[76] τυρβάξαι is an epexegetical infinitive of result or purpose in apposition to θέσκελα ἔργα. If, as Merkelbach and West 1967: 101 thought, μίσγω is a scribal gloss for τυρβάζω that accidentally made its way into the text (see n74 above), we must either emend τυρβάξας to τυρβάξαι (to match the infinitive μεῖξαι), or assume that the gloss once read μείξας (to match τυρβάξας). (Note that -αι in hiatus retains its metrical length in thesis.)

[77] κατὰ Διὸς προσταγήν (*argumentum* of the *Kypria* in *PEG* 1.39 Bernabé).

Alexandros for his decision. Even if this is not the precise myth that motivates the formulation of the fragment—the motives of particular deities for their support of, or opposition to, the Trojans are not always clear—it helps us to see how a sequence of causal relations like the one fr. 204 describes might be credited with the end of the heroic age.[78]

Hermione's role suggests that there is, after all, a contrast between the τέκνα θεῶν and the θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι. But it is not a radical one of kind, only a modest one of degree: a difference between immediate descendants of the gods (like Helen) and mortals who are two or more degrees of separation removed from divine parents (like Hermione). We have a good epic example of τέκνα θεῶν in this sense when Odysseus in the underworld describes Theseus and Peirithoos as θεῶν ἐρικυδέα τέκνα (*Od.* 11.631). *Il.* 14.318 expressly notes that Peirithoos is the offspring of Zeus. Of Theseus's divine parentage by Poseidon, broadly attested by later traditions (e.g., Bakkhylides 17.33–36), we do not have explicit testimony in Homer.[79] All the same, the entire heroic race is θεῖον (*Op.* 159), for the genealogical turn of mind sees the offspring from the perspective of the original demigod who alone can claim a god or goddess as his immediate parent.[80] But, if we press the label, all those in a relationship of genetic descent are demigods too, if sometimes (by a notional dilution of first-generation blood) unable to surpass or even match the accomplishments of their ancestors. The gods care especially, but not exclusively, for the founder of each lineage. What makes my distinction apropos in its context, unlike the implausible one of demigods objectionably marrying undeserving "ordinary" mortals, is that, properly understood, the immediate offspring of the gods, taken collectively, constitute the root from which the entire heroic genealogical

[78] Marg 1970: 515–16 believes that the δίχα of fr. 204.95 implies not just general disagreement but two distinct parties, specifically, the factions in the *Iliad*. But he disavows a connection with the judgment of Paris. So already in Schubart and Wilamowitz 1907: 42.

[79] One cannot press the patronymic *Aigeidēs* at *Il.* 1.265 to yield a mortal progenitor. Double parentage—a true divine one and a conventional mortal one, whose patronymic is used freely—is rather common: even Bakkhylides 17.15–16, emphatic as he is about Poseidon's siring Theseus, calls him Πανδίονος ἔκγονος. Cf. Gantz 1993: 1.63 and 1.248–49.

[80] Heroic epic is prevented in practice from expressing this mindset freely, for heroes do not have the leisure and opportunity to trace their family line to its very roots. And sometimes, as with Glaukos and Bellerophon, the narrative requires attention to a particular ancestor somewhere in the middle of the tree. The architecture of the *Catalogue* itself is a testament to the potential and limitations of genealogical arrangement.

tree grows. And if Zeus is determined to bring the heroic age (the abundant race of mortals) to an end, it is only appropriate that he attack the problem "at the root." My interpretation thus emphasizes continuity, not discontinuity, in the lines of descent.[81] And it has the advantage of making of a piece Zeus's preventing the gods' mortal offspring from mating with other mortals *and* his purpose to make away with the earth's burden; even as it takes into account the *Catalogue*'s thematic heart, which sees in the gods' mortal progeny the springs from which the entire heroic age is populated.

Some may still take refuge in the adverbial interpretation of πολλόν at fr. 204.99: not as γένος ... πολλόν, "the abundant race," but πολλὸν ἀϊστῶσαι, "to make away with many [of]" (i.e., "to decimate").[82] This partial annihilation would be contrasted with what is presumed to be the *total* annihilation of the demigods at 99–100. By implication, the text would be drawing a hard contrast between the latter and the γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων. But at 118–19 we read that ... π]ολλὰς Ἀΐδηι κεφαλὰς ἀπὸ χαλκὸν ἰάψ[ει]ν / ἀν]δ̣ρ̣ῶν ἡ̣ρ̣ώων ἐν δηϊοτῆτι πεσόντων. If at 99 πολλόν is allegedly drawing attention to the partial demise of putative "ordinary" mortals, by the same logic the text would now be focusing on the fact that some ἥρωες survive into the next age ("many" fall, but not all). This faces us with a paradox: the *heroic* age is drawn to a close by the total demise of a category of beings, the demigods, who are not interchangeable with heroes,[83] while at least some heroes survive the close of

[81] The interpretation I oppose restricts the demigods to what I have called immediate descendants of the gods. Thus, e.g., Menelaos would not be a demigod, but Helen would. And it drives too hard a distinction between demigods and the rest of mortals (contrast *Il.* 24.258–59). We are assured that, just as the gods object to their immediate offspring mating with "ordinary" mortals, they also intend to void their mortal condition by translating them *en masse* to the Isles of the Blest. It is even claimed that this development will restore to them their original (and, one assumes, intended) condition of blessedness, "away from humans." (Note that the poet uses "humans," ἀνθρώπων, at fr. 204.103 M-W without qualification!) But this exaggerates a distinction of degree and makes it ontological. The text distinguishes between the gods' human offspring and other mortals, but it puts the emphasis on their common mortality, and, in good consequence, on their common end, the grave. (On the pervasive presence in the *Catalogue* of what some call the "ephemeral" traits of life—those things that afflict putative "ordinary" mortals—see Schmitt 1975: 27 and n30.) Zeus targets the *entire* genealogical tree—root, trunk, and branches. Even Theseus and Peirithoos are in Hades!

[82] Evelyn-White 1914 translates "to make an utter end of the race." Most 2007 renders it, "to annihilate most of the race." Cf. Marg 1970: 516.

[83] Arguably in contradiction with *Op.* 159–60 and *Hymn. Hom.* 31.18–19. Aristot. *Pol.* 1332b17–18 implicitly equates heroes and demigods when he restates the tripartite division as "gods, heroes, and humans."

their own age. The implausibility of this interpretation suggests that, whether we take πολλόν at 99 as attributive to γένος or adverbial with ἀϊστῶσαι, it is not drawing a distinction between complete and partial annihilation of two putatively different kinds of beings. Even as some heroes do survive (witness, in the Homeric tradition, Menelaos, Nestor, etc.), so also do some immediate descendants of the gods (witness Helen and Aineas). Consequently, the destruction of the "souls of the demigods" denotes the end of the population of the heroic age, generally considered, and does not bespeak a numerically exhaustive annihilation. The birth of Hermione dramatically punctuates the end of the age, as she signally promises the continuation of what Zeus has already determined must come to an end. This provokes the action of the god, which starts with divine strife and results in the Trojan War. The *Catalogue* may also be taking advantage of Helen's divine status at various sites around Sparta[84]: her giving birth to a mortal issue foregrounds the intersection of the mortal and immortal planes which Zeus is intent on separating.[85]

5. Who fails to understand Zeus's plan?

Once the inclusion of the "children of the gods" among the demigods is accepted, and agreeing for the time being to μιχθῆι at 101,[86] it is not difficult to find an acceptable supplement to ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶντα. For, in the context of death (ὀλέσθαι, 99) one may expect a circumlocution for physical life. West's φάος ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶντα, "while seeing the light with their eyes," can be used for "[remaining] alive."[87] Wilamowitz's μόρον is not compelling if the τέκνα θεῶν are not gods who might be dissuaded from mating with mortals when they see their doom (in order to eschew the attendant grief). If the τέκνα are the subset of demigods who descend immediately from a divine parent, μόρον must denote either their own doom or the doom of others with whom they could mate. Let us assume the latter: why would the "seeing" (the ὁρῶντα would be causal) dissuade or prevent the τέκνα, themselves mortal, from mating? It is, after all, the heroes' doom (i.e., the demigods') that epic poetry everywhere sings, not the doom of a putative "ordinary" humanity.

[84] See Harder 2005. Panhellenic poetry sometimes uses epichoric traditions as a foil.

[85] Marg 1970: 514–15 thinks that the *eidolon* myth, perhaps first introduced by Hesiod (fr. 358 M-W), is a reflection of her alternative divine status; and that this too accounts for the special treatment she receives in the *Orestes* and in the *Odyssey* (with Menelaos).

[86] For alternatives, see section 6 below.

[87] Cf. *Theog.* 451; Hes. fr. 58.12; *Hymn. Hom. Ven.* 105, 256 (cf. 272; *Il.* 1.605, 5.120, 8.485, etc.).

μόρον could only be justified if Zeus were only feigning to destroy the demigods, but really intended to translate them *en masse* to the Isles of the Blest and spare them the grief of seeing the "ordinary" mortals' doom.[88] These are interpretive choices I have already rejected. But if we assume the first alternative, that μόρον denotes the doom of the demigods (or the τέκνα, a subset of them), what could "seeing their own doom with their eyes" mean? Are we to think the τέκνα would not mate with (other) mortals because they see their own impending doom? This is a strange notion. Not to mention that Zeus has no need of a deterrent, since destroying the demigods suffices to prevent the mating. Therefore, ὁρῶντα cannot be causal; it can only be another way of saying "meeting their death." The τέκνα do not mate with mortals because Zeus kills them before they do. In the event, this meaning is the negative correlate of the one entailed by φάος. Demigods do not stay alive and therefore cannot continue to populate the earth.

And so we come to the ultimate intention of Zeus, to which the destruction of the heroic race of demigods is instrumental.[89] This final end is presumably what the individual of 120–23—let us call him "X"—does not understand. It is not safe to assume on the basis of Zeus's designation merely as πατρός that the text speaks of a god.[90] Not infrequently mortals (the heroes or the epic narrator) also address Zeus as "father"[91]; so also do even gods (or goddesses) whom we might not expect to use the title.[92] Seers and other distinguished

[88] ὁρῶντα would stand for a coordinate "and [so] see their doom," implying the notion of result or purpose: "Zeus pretended to destroy the demigods, so that they would not mate with mortals and see their doom."

[89] On the contrast μὲν ... ἀλλά, see above.

[90] As the oracular god who concerns himself with the will of Zeus, Apollo seems the favorite choice (first suggested by Schubart and Wilamowitz 1907: 42–43). This judgment is partially based on the conjecture that one should construe line 117 with a τις somewhere in the *lacunae* of 116. The meaning would have been that none of the gods and men understood what Zeus was up to. So, e.g., Scodel 1982: 38n11.

[91] Just in the *Iliad*, at 2.146, 2.371, 3.276, 3.320, 3.351, 3.365, 7.60(?), 7.132, 7.179, 7.202, 8.236, 10.154, 11.66, 12.164, 13.631, 13.796, 13.818, 14.414, 15.372, 15.638, 16.97, 16.228, 16.253, 17.19, 17.47, 17.499, 17.645, 19.270, 20.192, 21.84, 21.273, 24.287, 24.308. It is true that in these cases πατήρ is accompanied by the properly declined form of Zeus. But this is often the case too when deities use the title. A context that makes clear that the "father" in question is Zeus, or a changed sensibility that does not resort to reflexive juxtaposition of "father" and "Zeus," may satisfactorily account for the sole appearance of πατρός in Hes. fr. 204.120 and 123. I do not think that this absence by itself strongly commends the identification of X as a god.

[92] E.g., Thetis at *Il.* 1.503; Hera at *Il.* 5.757, 5.762, 19.121; and Poseidon at *Il.* 7.446.

mortals have also been suggested.[93] In any case, it is certain that Homeric poetry saliently features the inscrutability of Zeus's proximate and ultimate purposes.[94] Furthermore, even if we conclude that we are dealing with a god who fails to understand the full extent of Zeus's plan, we must not add the unnecessary inference that he specifically misapprehends Zeus's intention to destroy the heroic race of demigods. This would contradict the meaning of πρόφασιν at 99 and call for the impossible reading, "Zeus made haste to annihilate the numerous race of mortal men, a pretext to destroy the demigods."[95] For otherwise we would have a god so dull-witted that he does not understand the plain meaning of Zeus's plain speech—speech that πρόφασιν implies. Under this scenario, the unidentified deity would think that Zeus was only going to destroy "ordinary" mortals, not realizing that the demigods would go the same way.[96] The simile of 121–22 might seem to confirm this view, for it appears to parallel X's feelings, as he ponders his misapprehension of Zeus's aims, with the pleasure of parents who delight in warding off death from their offspring. "X thinks Zeus will preserve some mortals X cares about, perhaps the god's immediate mortal offspring," runs the thought. "But he is wrong, for Zeus intends their destruction."

All of this is possible, if sheer conjecture, but hardly plausible or necessary. For similes do not work this way. The terms of comparison are often focused on a point that, to the modern reader, seems marginal, occasionally even inverting the apparent thrust of the simile.[97] A case in point is *Il.* 24.480–82, which likens Akhilleus's amazement at seeing Priam to the wonder experienced by the members of a rich household when they see at their door one who has been exiled from his own country on account of the killing (murder? man-slaughter?) of another. If we had only a fragmentary text of this passage and little of its context, we might wrongly conclude that Priam was guilty of

[93] Clay 2005: 32–33 suggests Kalkhas, whom Marg 1970: 518 also names. She also puts forward Agamemnon (33). Most 2008: 57–58 is skeptical.

[94] Cf. Griffin 1980: 169–70 and Marg 1970: 517. Lyric picks up on this motif, too. So, e.g., do Mimnermos fr. 2.4–5 W, Semonides fr. 1.3–5 W, and Simonides fr. 20.9 W^2.

[95] I.e., Zeus would have kept to himself his intent to destroy the demigods; and, by implication, the ἡμίθεοι would have to be distinguished from the γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων. I hardly need to reiterate that this interpretation is untenable.

[96] This calls for the hard distinction, already repudiated, between the ἥρωες and the ἡμίθεοι.

[97] Cf. Jachmann 1958: 267–338 with Page 1960: 108. For a different view that nevertheless illustrates the complex ways in which similes relate to the surrounding narrative, see Edwards 1991: 30–34.

man-slaughter or murder. In point of fact, if anything, the situation commends the opposite role assignment.[98] So also in this fragment of the *Catalogue*, as in *Iliad* 24, there may well be irony, as some surmise. But lines 121–22 may be ironic precisely because, to the pleasure of people warding off destruction from their τέκνα, the poet likens X's pleasure in pondering Zeus's devising "great things" (μεγάλα, 123), i.e., awful deeds "for men,"[99] deeds that portend nothing but destruction for the gods' τέκνα. All speculations aside, the text (to the extent that it is readable) only requires us to hold that, up to some particular point,[100] someone was not perceiving the "thrust of the father's mind,"[101] and, in consequence, was rejoicing in what he knew (or thought he knew) of Zeus's purposes.

With the aid of the *Iliad* it is not difficult to construct scenarios for verses 120–23 that are consistent with my interpretation of πρόφασιν. If X is a man, he could be a Trojan leader who, as Zeus turns the tides against the Akhaians, wrongly thinks that he intends to give Troy the ultimate victory in the war. Consequently, he rejoices that his forces will successfully ward off doom from the women and children in the city.[102] Or he could be an Akhaian commander who, knowing that Zeus will at length bring about the sack of Troy, foolishly thinks that the war effort must soon be done. But his insight of Zeus's thrust is woefully partial, for he fails to realize that he intends to use the Trojans' vigorous defense of their city (as they fight to ward off doom from their women and children—herein, if any, the irony of the simile!) to decimate both

[98] Other examples may be cited. Note the elaborate nature of the simile at *Od.* 5.394–97, whose sole contact with the action is the notion "gladly welcomed" (ἀσπάσιος::ἀσπαστόν); again, at *Od.* 23.233–38, Penelope's joy in her husband is equated to the happiness of shipwrecked sailors who have swum ashore, an image that better suits Odysseus. On these two similes see Friedrich 1981: 133–37, esp. 135n23. Cf. Edwards 1991: 33 for similes that appear to take on a life of their own.

[99] Cf. θέσκελα ἔργα (96).

[100] The οὔ πώ ποτε of 120 need *not* be after the war has begun, for the construction of 118, like that of 116, appears to depend on ἔμελλεν (116).

[101] "Thrust" translates ὁρμή (120) which, like ἐρωή at 122, denotes effort and forward motion (i.e., "push," "impetus," "drive," "momentum"). In a martial context, these words may evoke the assault of an army: Zeus's plan, his deliberate will, translates into armies joining battle. (Given the words μεγάλ' ἀνδράσι μηδομένοιο, it is unlikely that ἐρωή in πραπίδων ... ἐρωῆι / πα]τρὸς denotes "pause.")

[102] See, e.g., the angry reaction of Hektor in *Il.* 18.285–309, esp. 293–95, to Polydamas's advice; and the narrator's editorializing: "Fools! For Pallas Athene took away their senses" (311).

armies and bring to an end the heroic age.[103] If, on the other hand, X is a god, we need only suppose that he marvels at Zeus's design—how cunningly he has brought about the world war between Greeks and Trojans through Helen and Akhilleus—knowing well that this will mean the end of the then-living heroes. But he fails to realize (as argued below) that the ultimate goal of Zeus is to prevent further intercourse between immortals and mortals. Not only the current generation of heroes but the heroic age itself will meet the end. Never again will there be a time in which gods form such close associations with mortals. Although I think that a divine identity for X is less likely, it is still possible. In any case, it need not preclude my understanding of πρόφασιν, so long as the simile does not establish a parallel between the expectation of the putative god X and mortals who delight in warding off destruction from their children. Similes need not, and often do not, presuppose such simplistic patterns of correspondence.

6. THE SUPPLEMENTS TO HES. FR. 204.100–1

Before moving on to 102–3, it is worth underlining once again that the passage presents us with many textual uncertainties. Consider the following supplements to 100–1, which differ significantly from the ones offered since the *editio princeps*:

πολλὸν ἀϊστῶσαι σ̣π̣ε̣ῦ̣δ̣ε̣, π̣ρ̣[ό]φασιν μὲν ὀλέσθαι
ψυχὰς ἡμιθέω[ν οἵς τ᾽ ὠκυμόρ]ο̣ι̣σ̣ι̣ βροτοῖσιν 100
τέκ̣να θεῶν μί[αν αἶσαν ἐν ὀφ]θαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶντα.

. . . avowedly to destroy
the lives of the demigods, the short-lived mortals whose
offspring see before their eyes one [and the same] doom from the gods.[104]

Alternatively:

πολλὸν ἀϊστῶσαι σ̣π̣ε̣ῦ̣δ̣ε̣, π̣ρ̣[ό]φασιν μὲν ὀλέσθαι
ψυχὰς ἡμιθέω[ν οἵς τ᾽ ὠκυμόρ]ο̣ι̣σ̣ι̣ βροτοῖσιν 100
τέκ̣να θεῶν μί[τον οὖλον ἐν ὀφ]θαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶντα.

[103] See, e.g., the prayer of Agamemnon to take Troy at *Il.* 2.412–18. He hopes for its fulfillment before sunset; a false, but understandable, expectation, considering the lying dream from Zeus (*Il.* 2.23–34; cf. 350–53). All the same, "not yet did the son of Kronos grant him fulfillment; but he accepted the sacrifice and continued to increase the wretched toil [of war]" (*Il.* 2.419–20). For an intimation of the truth, cf. *Il.* 14.85–87.

[104] Just as the parents are mortal and short-lived, so also their offspring meet only with the fate of death which the gods ordain.

. . . avowedly to destroy
the lives of the demigods, the short-lived mortals whose
offspring see before their eyes a baneful fate from the gods.[105]

Both supplements are to be construed with a suppressed ἐστίν (on which see below). They assert that each heroic line of descent in its entirety faces Zeus's doom. The plural θεῶν makes his will extensive to all gods and points to their involvement in strife, which Zeus makes instrumental to his will. As supplemented here, the point of these lines is that *both* parents *and* children are short-lived and face annihilation. The objectionable circumstances Zeus promises to end are not merely tied to the particular generation of heroes then living. It is not a state of affairs that will heal once their children have reached maturity. No redemption is possible, and the children now face a doom as certain as their parents'.[106] Since the poem's thematic core has all along been genealogical origins and growth, it is only proper that in describing the end of the age it explicitly preclude genealogical propagation. Such interest in the process of generational replacement constitutes a traditional subject that the audience may rightfully expect. One need only remember the extended focus the *Odyssey* places on Telemakhos, and its portrayal of generational continuity at its conclusion (*Od.* 24.506–15); or Akhilleus's pointed inquiry after the fortunes of Neoptolemos in *Od.* 11.492–93 (cf. 505–40); or the *Odyssey*'s repeated mention of Orestes,[107] who will now carry on the "history" of the house of Atreus.[108]

I am not offering these supplements as superior to the long-established alternatives, which are already susceptible of an interpretation agreeable to my views. They have some intrinsic advantages and surely, too, comparative disadvantages. But if they are even marginally acceptable, they make the point that one cannot read too much into the traditional reconstructions. The assumption of a syntactic dependence of θεῶν on τέκνα, e.g., turns out not to be necessary, as it could be construed with a following noun once we abandon the notion that it is followed by a verb. The nouns in my supplements suggest the fate or doom that the gods impose. For instances of the relative pronoun in the dative masculine plural in Homer see *Il.* 2.338, 3.109, and *Od.* 3.408,

[105] The baneful fate is death.

[106] Cf. Andromakhe's laments for Astyanax (*Il.* 22.477–514, esp. 484–89, and 24.726–28), which she makes extensive to all of Troy's τέκνα (*Il.* 24.730).

[107] *Od.* 1.30, 40–41, 298–300; 3.306–8; 4.546; 11.457–61.

[108] Even the *Iliad*, whose plot gives less scope to it, instances the theme. See, e.g., *Il.* 19.327 on Neoptolemos, *Il.* 2.260 and 4.354 on Telemakhos, and *Il.* 9.142 and 284 on Orestes.

24.312; in Hesiod, *Theog.* 432, 439, *Op.* 238, and fr. 200.7 M-W.[109] Concerning the "epic τε," see Chantraine 1997 [1953], 2, §§350–54; for Hesiod's use, cf. West 1978: 222 on 265–66.[110] The form οἷς is rarer in Homer, but more common in Hesiod.[111] If οἷσι (or οἷσιν) be preferred, one might supply οἷσιν θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσιν instead.[112] For the characteristic suppression of "to be" in relative clauses, see Monro 1992 [1882], §271 and consider the following examples[113]:

- *Od.* 4.602–3: σὺ γὰρ πεδίοιο ἀνάσσεις / εὐρέος, ᾧ ἔνι[114] μὲν λωτὸς πολύς ...
- *Od.* 5.488–89: ὡς δ' ὅτε τις δαλὸν σποδιῇ ἐνέκρυψε μελαίνῃ / ἀγροῦ ἐπ' ἐσχατιῆς, ᾧ μὴ πάρα γείτονες ἄλλοι
- *Od.* 8.403–4: δώσω οἱ τόδ' ἄορ παγχάλκεον, ᾧ ἔπι κώπη / ἀργυρέη ...
- *Od.* 16.421–23: μάργε, τίη δὲ σὺ Τηλεμάχῳ θάνατόν τε μόρον τε / ῥάπτεις, οὐδ' ἱκέτας ἐμπάζεαι, οἷσιν ἄρα Ζεὺς / μάρτυρος ...
- Hes. *Sc.* 393–95: ἦμος δὲ χλοερῷ κυανόπτερος ἠχέτα τέττιξ / ὄζῳ ἐφεζόμενος θέρος ἀνθρώποισιν ἀείδειν / ἄρχεται, ᾧ τε πόσις καὶ βρῶσις θῆλυς ἐέρση.

The syntactic skeleton of my supplements is οἷς τέκνα [ἐστίν], "who have children," comparable to οἷσιν ἄρα Ζεύς [ἐστιν],"who have Zeus" (*Od.* 16.422). To τέκνα, an adjective is added, in this case, a verbal adjective, the attributive participle ὁρῶντα: οἷς τέκνα [ἐστὶν] ὁρῶντα, "who have children who see" (which I translate above, "whose offspring see"). Similarly, οἷσιν ἄρα Ζεὺς

[109] Also fr. 372.3 M-W, classified as spurious.

[110] Its presence in the supplement is preferable but not indispensable.

[111] Cf. Troxler 1964: 64.

[112] οἷσίν τ' or οἷσίν τε would be possible with an adjective of the proper metrical shape. Its meaning might be "hard-pressed," "grieving," *vel sim.* κακός, e.g., is metrical (οἷσίν τε κακοῖσι βροτοῖσιν), but implausible in connection with ἡμίθεοι. Instances of relatival οἷσίν τ' and οἷσί τε in Homer are *Hymn. Hom.* 3.518, *Il.* 5.747, and *Od.* 3.435, 7.74, 16.217, 17.423 (= 19.79); of οἷσι(ν) alone, *Hymn. Hom.* 2.150, 6.11, *Il.* 2.805, 6.357, 10.418, 11.686, 13.717, 14.85, 23.159, 23.405, 24.202, and *Od.* 2.234 (= 5.12), 4.9, 4.434, 10.110, 16.97 (= 16.115), 16.422. In Hesiod we find οἷσιν at *Op.* 145 and fr. 17a.16 M-W. The latter features a dative of possession with an explicit ἦν.

[113] With these, compare *Od.* 11.490, with an explicit form of "to be": ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη.

[114] Note that the use of ἔνι and πάρα for ἔνεστι and πάρεστι (cf. ἔπι) does *not* make them into verbs (or abbreviations of verbs). They are examples of what Schwyzer 1939–94: 2.419 rightly calls the "freiere adverbiale Verwendung von Präpositionen" (cf. *ibid.* 423 and Monro 1992 [1882], §177). This usage grows precisely out of the ready suppression of "to be," together with the early adverbial function of parts of speech that, in classical Attic prose, are generally susceptible of prepositional use only.

μάρτυρός [ἐστιν],"who have Zeus as witness."[115] With the relative clause whose ἐστίν is suppressed, we can parallel *Il.* 2.822–23: οὐκ οἷος, ἅμα τῷ γε δύω Ἀντήνορος υἷε / Ἀρχέλοχός τ᾽ Ἀκάμας τε μάχης εὖ εἰδότε πάσης. Here, the demonstrative τῷ is construed with ἅμα and a suppressed ἦστην; like τέκνα, the subjects "Arkhelokhos and Akamas" take an attributive participle, εἰδότε.[116] Although ἡμιθέων in line 100 of the fragment is the antecedent of my supplements' relative pronoun, ὠκυμόροισι/θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσιν might still be felt as an instance of incorporation, on which see Smyth 1956, §2536–38 and Kühner, Gerth, and Blass 1992 [1890–1904], 2.2, §556.3.[117]

Homer uses ὠκύμορος with Akhilleus, the suitors, and arrows.[118] In fr. 11.18 W^2 Simonides observes that Homer ... ἐπώνυμον ὁπ[λοτέρ]οισιν / ποίησ᾽ ἡμ]ιθέων ὠκύμορον γενεή̣[ν.[119] The combination θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσιν occurs in Homer and Hesiod seven times.[120] I construe the attributive participle ὁρῶντα in the spirit of characteristic epithets like θεοὶ ... αἰὲν ἐόντες or βροτοὶ ... σῖτον ἔδοντες[121]; Hes. fr. 294.1–2 (Hesiod's or Kerkops's) furnishes an example in the middle voice: καί οἱ ἐπὶ σκοπὸν Ἄργον ἴει κρατερόν τε μέγαν τε / τέτρασιν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρώμενον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα. For the first supplement, [Oppian], *Kynēgetika* 2.440 serves as model: τοὶ δ᾽ αἶσαν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶντες. It speaks of fishes who follow the *soubos* and who, "though seeing doom before their eyes, hate him not even so nor desert their

[115] Or, construing οἷσιν not as a dative of possession, but of advantage, "to whom Zeus [is] witness" (μάρτυρος as a predicate nominative rather than a noun in apposition). Both types are instances of the dative of interest (Smyth 1954, §1474–85), and here, as often, the meaning is largely indifferent to the analysis favored.

[116] One might supply instead the corresponding form of the verb ἦρχεν (*Il.* 2.819). In any case, the alternative of a suppressed "to be" is readily felt and doubtless accounts, e.g., for the translations of Murray 1924–25 and Lattimore 1951 ("[h]e was not alone; with him *were* ..." and "not Aineias alone, but with him *were* ...," my emphasis).

[117] A relevant example, although not exactly parallel to my supplement, is *Od.* 16.97–98 (= 16.115–16). Any who still think the syntax of my supplements harsh might wish to calibrate their perception against the following: ὅσσαι μὲν Τρώων πυρὸς ἐσχάραι, οἷσιν ἀνάγκη, / οἵ δ᾽ ἐγρηγόρθασι φυλασσέμεναί τε κέλονται / ἀλλήλοις (*Il.* 10.418–20); πάντα γὰρ οὐ κακός εἰμι, μετ᾽ ἀνδράσιν ὅσσοι ἄεθλοι (*Od.* 8.214).

[118] Akhilleus: *Il.* 1.417, 1.505, 18.95, 18.458. Suitors: *Od.* 1.266, 4.346, 17.137. Arrows: *Il.* 15.441, *Od.* 22.75.

[119] This perspective, faithful to the Homeric portrayal of the heroes, repudiates the alleged disparity in the *Catalogue* between demigods and "ordinary" heroes, or between demigod-heroes and "ordinary" mortals. Note also Simonides' fr. 523 *PMG.*

[120] *Hymn. Hom.* 3.69, 7.20, *Od.* 3.3, 7.210, 12.386, *Theog.* 223, 500 (cf. 903).

[121] Cf. Chantraine 1997 [1953], 2, §463.

slayer."[122] There is, of course, nothing late about the expression or the diction, even if this particular arrangement is only found in [Oppian]. Homer often uses αἶσα for fate[123] and, more narrowly, doom.[124] It is even expressly tied in the *Iliad* to a short life, a connotation apropos here[125]; and it is readily construed with a genitive of divine source in the very fragment that concerns us (fr. 204.126).[126] The expression ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν is also current in archaic epic.[127] The alternative μίτον οὖλον cannot claim the same degree of traditionality. For although μίτος appears in a simile at *Il.* 23.762, there it has its literal sense, "warp," and not the one demanded here, "thread of destiny," as in [Lykophron] 584 or Manetho 1.7 Koechly (cf. LSJ s.v. I.2).[128] Scholars will reasonably differ on whether this transferred meaning is conceivable in the *Catalogue*. For οὖλος, see *Il.* 2.6 and 2.8 (of the dream), 5.461 and 5.717 (of Ares), and 21.536 (of Akhilleus).[129]

A few comments about the readings of the papyrus are in order. The photograph that accompanies this article—to my knowledge, the first ever published of the second column of *P. Berol.* 10560[130]—cannot account for what editors up to Merkelbach and West read as fragments within the large *lacuna* that starts at line 100. In its current state, nothing remains in the papyrus that could justify the first editors' report of an]ι[in line 101[131]; and the small "peninsula" that stretches vertically into the *lacuna* at its top right preserves

[122] The translation is from Mair 1928.

[123] *Il.* 1.418, 15.209,16.707, 22.477, 24.224.

[124] *Il.* 16.441 (= 22.179), 22.61; cf. the expression ἐν θανάτοιό περ αἴσῃ at 24.428 and 750.

[125] *Il.* 1.416.

[126] *Il.* 9.608, 17.321. I have collected only examples from the *Iliad*. See the *LfgrE* s.v. for others.

[127] *Hymn. Hom.* 5.83, 5.179; *Il.* 1.587, 3.306, 18.135, 18.190, 24.294, 24.312; *Od.* 8.459, 10.385, 14.343; Hes. fr. 145.13.

[128] Cf. Manetho 1.201 Koechly, Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5.8.49.3, *PGM* 4.2313–15, Synesios, *De insomniis* 17.13–17 Terzaghi, *Oracula Sibyllina* 5.215 Geffcken, Epiph. *Adv. haeres.* 1.185.11, and Nonnos, *Dion.* 3.357.

[129] Perhaps also Hes. fr. 25.21 M-W (of φάρμακον).

[130] I thank Dr. Fabian Reiter, the curator of the collection of papyri housed at the Ägyptisches Museum und Papyrussammlung, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, for his kindness in providing me with the photograph, taken by Ms. Sandra Steiß at his request. Merkelbach and West declined to include a photograph in their edition: "itaque omnium iam papyrorum Hesiodearum imagines potes exquirere, si libet, praeter unius Berolinensis 10560 (= fr. nostrum 204) partem posteriorem, ubi adeo expalluit atramentum ut decipiant phototypa citius quam adiuvent" (1967: vi).

[131] Schubart and Wilamowitz 1907: 34.



Figure 1. *P. Berol.* 10560, col. 2. Ägyptisches Museum und Papyrussammlung, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin. Photograph S. Steiß. Reproduced by permission.



Figure 2. *P. Berol.* 10560, col. 2, detail. Ägyptisches Museum und Papyrussammlung, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin. Photograph S. Steiß. Reproduced by permission.

nothing but the most minute speckles of faint traces. There is nothing there on which to ground the identification of an]ọ.[, however tentatively. I can only assume that between now and the early 1960s, when Merkelbach and West and Stiewe last inspected the papyrus, fragments once in the *lacuna* have gone missing. Hence, no independent verification or refutation of previous reports of these fragments is any longer possible. Therefore, I must circumscribe my judgment of Merkelbach and West's [...].[..]ọ.[for line 101 to what I can plausibly conjecture on the basis of previous reports and the current state of the papyrus. To return to the ι̣ reported by the first editors, Merkelbach and West's choice merely to print instead a dot flanked by *lacunae*, μι[...].[..] ọ.[ὀφ], should urge against dismissing a supplement strictly on the grounds that it does not accommodate the corresponding trace.[132] In any case, αἶσαν accommodates the alleged iota. And οὖλον does too, for the vertical staff of the upsilon is consistent with traces of an iota.[133] Given the fragment's letter widths, -χθῆι should span 12 arbitrary units (more on the spacing below), whereas -αν αἶ- and -τον οὖ- would span 14. These counts are close enough that the latter two must be adequate if the former is. Regarding Merkelbach and West's]ọ.[, Wilamowitz simply printed a *lacuna* with the supplement [μόρον ὀφ]. Stiewe 1963: 3 had reported the]ọ.[as "von mir neu gelesen." As noted above, the papyrus does not allow for any determination, not even a tentative one. But even if these authorities were right to record traces consistent with an omicron (and I give their agreement some weight), I must note that an epsilon (like the one in]ἐν [ὀφ]) cannot be ruled out, since the scribe occasionally gives the upper half of his epsilon a shape that closely resembles an omicron.[134] The remains tentatively identified as an omicron could belong to one such epsilon. Now, considering the *lacuna* of 100 between ἡμιθέω[and

[132] Rzach's 1908 edition reports MI...I, probably just on the authority of the *editio princeps*. He does not dot the second iota, but this is likely a typographic slip and not the outcome of Schubart's post-Crönert inspection (see Rzach 1908: v), since Crönert 1907 himself is silent on this line. Stiewe 1963: 2 reports ι̣ too.

[133] Schubart and Wilamowitz 1907: 34 note: "das Iota in der Mitte kann auch Υ oder Ρ gewesen sein." Other possibilities, e.g., the vertical traces of a N, might be suggested. The dots printed within the square brackets are, of course, only rough editorial inferences from the width of the *lacunae*.

[134] The ἀπείρονα of line 97 offers a good example. The upper half of the ε is strongly marked, in contrast to faint lower traces, and it is not all that different from the round part of the ρ and the ο that follow it. (The upper arch of the scribe's ε sometimes curves down markedly towards the vowel's horizontal bisector, approaching the shape of a closed ο, and might conceivably be mistaken for it if other distinguishing traces are too faint to see.)

]ι̣ρι̣,[135] as well as the span in 101 between μι[and]θαλμοῖσιν, their respective widths, in arbitrary units, are approximately 37 and 33. Once average widths of the pertinent letters are computed, I find that the supplements for 100 correspond to the following approximate widths:

- Line 100 (37 units)
  ΝΜΗΕΠΙΧΘΟΝΙΟ ≈ 31 units (36 units)[136]
  ΝΙΝΑΜΗΔΕΙΛΟ ≈ 33 units (38 units)
  ΝΟΙΣΤΩΚΥΜΟΡΟ ≈ 31 units (36 units)
- Line 101 (33 units)
  ΧΘΗΙΜΟΡΟΝΟΦ ≈ 28 units
  ΝΥΘΗΙΦΑΟΣΟΦ ≈ 25 units
  ΑΝΑΙΣΑΝΕΝΟΦ ≈ 33 units
  ΤΟΝΟΥΛΟΝΕΝΟΦ ≈ 35 units

The kerning at the opening of 100 is about 132% more generous than on average, but by the end of the line (βροτοῖσιν) it has shrunk to the average. To estimate *grosso modo* the actual width under this variable spacing I use the mean of the regular and the expanded factors, i.e., 116%. The resulting scaled units are listed above in parentheses, following the approximate total widths for regular spacing.[137] Variation from line to line suggests that all of the supplements to line 100 fit the spacing, with ἡμιθέω[ν ἵνα μὴ δειλο]ῖσι marginally less likely on this sole ground. As to the supplements to line 101, mine fit the spacing no worse (perhaps better) than the long-standing supplements by the first editors and West.[138]

[135] The photograph suggests that to measure the span accurately it is best to include in the *lacuna* the ο̣ of Merkelbach and West's]ο̣ι̣σι̣. Crönert 1907: 611 first reported the ο̣. Rzach's 1908 edition prints]οῖσι, which may reflect Schubart's confirmation of Crönert (it is not clear). Stiewe 1963: 2, however, only prints]..[..]ισι and very tentatively suggests]ε̣ι̣[..]ι̣σι on page 3: "Vielleicht ist]ε̣ι̣[..]ισι zu erkennen, doch]ε̣ι̣[nur schattenhaft."

[136] See below for these parentheses.

[137] I must emphasize that these estimates, though sufficient for my purposes, do not lay claim to scientific accuracy. To approach such precision would require assigning to each letter an average width and a standard deviation; and using the latter to compute the corresponding standard deviation for the total width. This would quantify the statistical significance of the computed excess length or shortfall of various supplements.

[138] [τον οὖλον ἐν ὀφ] exceeds the spacing by 6%, an amount unlikely to be statistically significant.

7. Zeus's ultimate purpose

In lines 102–3 we find the ultimate purpose of Zeus: the separation of mortals and immortals.[139] I cannot accept that μάκαρες refers to mortal demigods.[140] This goes against the uniform usage of epic poetry: οἱ μάκαρες, in the plural and by itself, should refer to the blessed gods.[141] When the adjective is applied to mortals, it is tellingly accompanied by a clarifying noun or adjective.[142] The only possible exception to this practice is *Op.* 549, where μακάρων ἔργα refers to the cultivated fields of rich men. Even here some have ascribed μακάρων to the gods.[143] As West 1978: 296 writes, if it does refer to mortals "the ellipse of ἀνδρῶν is bold."[144] Even the Isles of the Blest, μακάρων νῆσοι (*Op.* 171), must originally have meant the "isles of the blessed [gods]."[145] In

[139] Already broached in Schwartz 1960: 43. Cf. Stiewe 1963: 6–7, Marg 1970: 517, Nagy 1999: 220, Cerutti 1998: 161–63, and Clay 2005: 28.

[140] *Pace* West 1985: 120 and Koenen 1994: 29n67.

[141] Although occasionally applied to *daimones*, it is regularly juxtaposed with θεοί. For Hesiodic instances, see *Theog.* 33, 101, 128, 881; *Op.* 136, 139, 718, 730 (perhaps euphemistically); *Sc.* 79, 247, 328, 476; Hes. frr. 14.6, 25.31, 30.24, 176.4, 211.7, 280.17, 309.1, and 10a.60 (this last from the *ed. minor*). Cf. De Heer 1969 *passim*, esp. 4–11 and 21–27.

[142] E.g., at *Op.* 139, where we meet the paradoxically named μάκαρες θνητοί.

[143] De Heer 1969: 23 remarks that "[i]n view of the general Hesiodic context it is more satisfactory to take μακάρων to refer to the deities to whom the ἔργα owe their fertility." I do not see why the *LfgrE* s.v. 2 classifies fr. 280.17 under "von Menschen." As Gantz 1993: 1.292 observes, Peirithoos believes that Zeus will approve his union, for he finds in the νόμοι of the gods, who often marry their sisters, the warrant to marry his half-sister Persephone. Hence ἐκ μακάρων γάμον ὄρνυται ἑδνώσασθαι (17) can only mean "he is seeking a marriage prompted by the blessed ones, to marry [a sister by the same father]." The text is not satisfactory because a reflexive middle for ὄρνυμι is exceptional. ἐκ might better be emended to ἐς ("he is being prompted to a marriage with the gods") or γάμον to γάμος ("a marriage is being encouraged by the gods"); or perhaps γάμον is being treated as if it were the infinitive γαμεῖν, so that from a double accusative in the active (equivalent to acc. + inf., "the gods prompt him to marry"; cf. *Od.* 23.222) we have a retained accusative (γάμον) in the passive. (Alternatively, Merkelbach 1949: 262n17 calls this a "doppelter Akkusativ des effizierten und affizierten Objekts.") None of the options is entirely satisfactory, but all of them point to the divine identity of μακάρων. Cf. *LfgrE* s.v. ὄρνυμι B.I.2b. Note that Hyg. *Fab.* 79.2 ascribes the prompting to seek Persephone, characteristically, to Zeus himself (*in quiete eis imperavit*). I must caution that section 3 of the *LfgrE* on μάκαρ contains much that cannot be embraced safely.

[144] Cf. *Il.* 11.68–69, *Od.* 1.217, and Hes. fr. 211.7.

[145] So West 1978: 193: "μάκαρες unqualified in the poetic language almost always means 'the gods', and there was no more natural way for a hexameter poet to say 'in the islands of the gods'." See the full note of West 1978 ad loc. If *Op.* 173a assumes that these

any case, fr. 204.117 puts to one side the θεῶν μακάρων and to the other the θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων. For me, the referent is clinched by the expression ὡς τὸ πάρος περ. Like others before me,[146] I do not believe that it can be said of the heroes, for they *never before* lived χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων.[147] Koenen 1994: 29n68 suggests that we construe μάκαρες closely with ὡς τὸ πάρος περ: so that far from humans they may, *blest as formerly*, have their livelihood and homes. But this is blocked by Cerutti's observation that when, according to Koenen, hardship and misery had not entered the world and mortals lived in regular intercourse with the gods (i.e., before the Theban and Trojan wars), they were *not yet*, strictly speaking, demigods.[148] They were just mortal men and women, who regularly consorted with the gods and, through sexual union with them, gave birth to the demigods. For the *lacuna* of 102 I accept Koenen's suggestion that what the scribe wrote amounts to ϰ̣[ὰς ὕστερο]ν, "henceforth as before," whether he omitted ἐς or, against epic practice, used crasis.[149] But I cannot accept the supplement to 103, tempted though we be by the parallel of *Op.* 167, for βίοτος, whether "life" or "livelihood," is a notion intimately tied to the condition of mortality. This association is so strong and constant that only the specious parallel, familiarity with the supplement, and the authority of its first advocates could have successfully combined to inure us to the inconcinnity.[150]

There are, however, two other contextually compelling possibilities (read on for a translation):

ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν μάκαρες κὰς ὕστερον ὡς τὸ πάρος περ
χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων εὐνὰς κατὰ ἤθε᾽ ἔχωσιν.

islands are far from the Olympian gods (τηλοῦ ἀπ᾽ ἀθανάτων), this is so that Kronos might rule there after the establishment of Zeus's order. Cf. 173bc. For a defense of *Op.* 173a-e, see Livrea 2008.

[146] Marg 1970: 517, Cerutti 1998: 159, and Clay 2005: 28.

[147] Cf. Koenen 1994: 29n68. I am here accepting for the sake of argument the notion that a valid distinction may be drawn between demigods and human beings generally.

[148] Cerutti 1998: 163: "Non ci pare tuttavia che il prologo esprima le condizioni beate degli eroi, quanto piuttosto le condizioni felici di quell'umanità iniziale che, potendo ancora unirsi con gli dei, generò gli eroi." Note, further, her objection that, in Greek religious thought, translation to the Isles of the Blest serves as an alternative to death, not as an optional state that follows it (163–64). Cf. also Davies 1992: 132–33.

[149] Koenen 1994: 28. The spacing makes ἐς marginally possible, *pace* Merkelbach and West's "puta verbum ἐς omissum esse."

[150] Cf. *LfgrE* s.v. The alternative is to accept the dismal thought that, although he was speaking about the gods, the poet's compositional technique was so defective that he could only muster a less-than-happy modification of *Op.* 167.

or

ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν μάκαρες κἀς ὕστερον ὡς τὸ πάρος περ
χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων φιλότητα κατ᾽ ἤθε᾽ ἔχωσιν.

The beginning of the line, χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρώπω[occupies some 43 arbitrary units. Average widths also add up to 43, which indicates typical sizes and spacing.[151] The span between ἀνθρώπω[and]ἤθε᾽ is about 40 units. The approximate widths of the supplements are:

NBIOTONKAI ≈ 31 units
NEYNAΣKATA ≈ 35 units
NΦIΛOTHTAKAT ≈ 43 units

We see that the first is perhaps too short; εὐνὰς κατά sits comfortably in the span (neither too short nor too long); while φιλότητα κατ᾽ is a little too long, but not so much as to be statistically significant. As to the syntax, in the case of εὐνάς I propose that ἀπό be taken in tmesis with ἔχωσιν: "but so that the blessed [gods], thenceforth as before, may keep their beds apart from mortals, as suits [divine] customs."[152] Note that I have substituted κατά for καί, for which Merkelbach and West's reading of ι̣ (after Crönert 1907: 611) need not be sustained. The first editors did not read anything for it, nor did Stiewe 1963: 2. The condition of the papyrus leaves ample room for doubt. κατὰ ἤθεα is the reading at *Od.* 14.411; κατ᾽ ἤθεα, at *Op.* 137 (corrected to ἀνθρώποις κατὰ ἤθεα by Bentley). Since observance of initial ϝ can follow simply from resort to traditional language (and, if so desired, can be restored at *Op.* 137 and 699), both forms are traditional and allowable.[153]

Regarding the supplement with εὐνάς, there is no dispute that εὐνή is used throughout the *Catalogue*, and Homeric and Hesiod poetry generally, to denote sexual intercourse.[154] ἀπέχω in the active ("ward or keep something

[151] In fact, the χ is a little wider than average. With its actual width, the total estimate is 45 units. The 4% excess length is statistically insignificant.

[152] For the mood of ἔχωσιν, see the beginning of section 3 above. I translate "so that," as if the supplement to 100 had μή or ἵνα μή. If one accepts my supplements to 100–1, a future must be used: "but the blessed [gods], thenceforth as before, will keep their beds apart," etc. (Or, to impart to the translation the sense of an indirect report: "but the blessed [gods], thenceforth as before, would keep their beds apart," etc.)

[153] Edwards 1971: 132–40.

[154] *LfgrE* s.v. B.3b.

from") or middle ("refrain from") is broadly exampled too.[155] As to κατὰ ἤθεα, we recall the song of the Muses at the opening of the *Theogony*, who celebrate "the laws (νόμους) and the cherished customs (ἤθεα κεδνά) of all the immortals" (66–67).[156] West 1966: 178 writes that "the epithet shows that ἤθεα here means 'manners'" and that we must read νόμους and not νομούς.[157] The advice to marry a maid, so that she may learn ἤθεα κεδνά (*Op.* 699) suggests that divine οἰκονομία, in particular, is in view in the song of the Muses. The divine order is seen through a double lens: its laws (each god's sphere of action) and divine society (household arrangements).[158] *Theog.* 62–64 shows Olympos disposed as a household, with δώματα (οἰκία) and χοροί, an organization that makes the location of the various divine dwellings significant. *Theog.* 73–74 suggests that νόμοι and ἤθεα are related and comprehended by the particular τιμαί accorded to each deity, for in establishing the Olympian order Zeus is said to have arranged well every particular for the gods alike and declared to each his honors.[159] κατὰ ἤθεα speaks of what is customary among gods ("accepted," and hence "acceptable"), and amounts to "as is proper."

In the case of φιλότητα, the syntax could be construed, as the first editors suggested, with χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων amounting to τηλοῦ: "but so that the blessed [gods], thenceforth as before, may have mutual affection (sex?) far from mortals, as suits [divine] customs"; or as reflecting ἀπέχω in tmesis: "but so that the blessed [gods], thenceforth as before, may keep [their] sexual affection apart from mortals, as suits [divine] customs." The word φιλότης, of course, spans the full range from "amity" to "sex," implying mutual affection and social intercourse. Thus, at *Od.* 10.333–35 Kirke tells Odysseus to sheath his sword and consent to having sex with her, that they may thus come to trust each other: νῶϊ δ' ἔπειτα / εὐνῆς ἡμετέρης ἐπιβήομεν, ὄφρα μιγέντε / εὐνῇ καὶ φιλότητι πεποίθομεν ἀλλήλοισιν. The juxtaposition of εὐνή and φιλότης is common and should be noted in light of my other supplement: both alterna-

[155] For the active, see *Il.* 6.96 and 277; cf. *Od.* 19.572. For the middle, *Il.* 8.35, 8.466, 11.799, 12.248, 14.78, 15.206 (= 15.305), 16.41, 18.199 and *Od.* 12.321, 12.328, 19.489.

[156] *Il.* 9.586, 17.28 and *Od.* 10.8 show that κεδνός, usually applied to people—a ruler, a servant, a spouse, a companion, one's parents—indicates closeness of belonging, a relationship of intimacy and trust, someone who cares for and is cared for by others. The expression κεδνὰ ἰδυῖα (*Od.* 1.428, 19.346, etc.) associates the adjective with the goodwill of φιλότης and the trustworthiness of σωφροσύνη. Hence the scholia D on *Il.* 24.730: <κεδνάς> κηδεμονικάς, σώφρονας.

[157] Cf. Hoekstra 1957: 220–21 and Troxler 1964: 168–69.

[158] ἤθεα shows that the νόμοι cannot be those assigned to mortals (but cf. *Op.* 276).

[159] I do not see a reason to emend the transmitted ὁμῶς, *pace* West 1966: 180.

tives amount to the same, namely, Zeus's plan to prevent gods thenceforth from keeping the sort of society with humans that allows for sexual intercourse.[160] Of course, neither εὐνάς nor φιλότητα connote mortality, in contrast to βίοτος, which inevitably points to the need for livelihood, importing a quintessentially *human* notion into what is supposed to be an exclusively divine context. Of interest is the observation in Luca 1981: 181 that sexual relations denoted by φιλότης imply a "participatory" valence, the absence of compulsion. Still, I would rather focus attention upon the institutional character of the word: it is a state of things, an established practice—sex between gods and mortals—that Zeus targets, and not simply the occasional liaison. φιλότητι and ἐν φιλότητι, most commonly with forms of the verb μίσγω, are pervasive in Homer and Hesiod.[161] That φιλότης may be used with ἔχω (and hence ἔχω + ἀπό and ἀπέχω) to mean "to have/keep affection" *vel sim.* is clear from Thgn. 1.860,[162] Philostr. *VA* 5.5.33–34,[163] and Naumakhios 44.[164]

Those who insist on positing ⟦ after the *lacuna* of 103 may prefer the supplement with φιλότητα. For even if there be traces of a vertical staff which the editors thought an iota, this feature, of course, is shared by the tau of κατ'; and the horizontal bar of a tau, which Merkelbach and West did not see, might have suffered the fortune of the tau that opens τυρβάξας at 98: the trace may have grown thin and the ink faint as the pen moved towards the right, so

[160] On φίλος and φιλότης, see Kakridis 1963, esp. 43–45, Benveniste 1969: 1.335–53, Luca 1981, esp. 175–81, Hamp 1982, Scott 1982, esp. 12 and 16, Taillardat 1982, Karavites 1986, esp. 481, Hooker 1987, esp. 55–57, and Hummel 1987, esp. 37. More recent bibliography in Montes Miralles 2008: 120n1.

[161] E.g., *Hymn. Hom.* 4.4, 5.17 (with δάμναται), 5.263, 5.287, 7.57, 18.4, 32.14, 33.5; *Il.* 2.232, 3.445, 6.25, 6.161, 6.165, 14.207, 14.295, 15.32, etc.; *Od.* 5.126, 8.271, 15.421, 19.266, etc.; *Theog.* 125, 306, 333, 374, 375, etc.; Hes. frr. 5.4, 17a.5, 35.14, etc.

[162] ἤν δέ τί μοί ποθεν ἐσθλόν, ἃ παυράκι γίνεται ἀνδρί, / πολλοὺς ἀσπασμοὺς καὶ φιλότητας ἔχω (1.859–60): "if something good befalls me from some quarter, which rarely happens to a man, I have many embraces and affections."

[163] ὡς μήτε νεῖκος τοῖς στοιχείοις ἐγγένοιτο μήτε ἀτιμάσειαν τὴν φιλότητα, ἣν ἀλλήλων ἴσχουσιν (5.5.32–34): "to ensure that there was no strife between the elements, and that they should not neglect the affection that they feel for each other" (translation by Jones 2005)

[164] γνώτω δ' ἀμφαδίην καὶ σὸς πόσις, ὅττι γε τέκνα / ἐκ θυμοῦ φιλέεις· ἐπεὶ οὔτι γε τοῖος ἐτύχθη / οἷος ἔχειν φιλότητα καὶ ἤθεα πιστὰ δαῆναι (Naumakhios *apud* Stob. 4.23.7.32–34): "Let your husband perceive openly that you love your children from the heart, since not at all was he so made as to have affection or learn faithful habits." Archaic epic makes φιλότης the object of ταμόντες (*Il.* 3.73), παράσχῃ (*Il.* 3.354), βάλωμεν (*Il.* 4.16), ἑλέσθαι (*Il.* 16.282), φυλάσσων (*Il.* 24.111), γνοίης (*Od.* 15.537), and τίθησθα (*Od.* 24.476). Nothing suggests that ἔχω and ἴσχω would not be similarly idiomatic.

that, hypothetically, were the *lacuna* not where it is, only the left portion (up to where it joins the vertical staff) would be readable today. If one insists on retaining the κα]ὶ, the verses would read:

ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν μάκαρες κὰς ὕστερον ὡς τὸ πάρος περ
χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων εὐνὰς καὶ ἤθε᾽ ἔχωσιν

ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ... ἔχωσιν could be construed as "keep from mortals," and ἤθεα denote those places on earth that gods favor and are wont to visit: "but so that the blessed [gods], thenceforth as before, may keep [their] beds and haunts apart from mortals, as suits [divine] customs." Close associations of particular gods and locations pervade hymnic literature. A god's physical presence at a given site, his personal visit in the past, would naturally provide the *aition* for the establishment of a cult, a place of worship henceforth graced only with the god's numinous presence or the exceptional epiphany.[165] The verses would imply that access to the gods in such places is now strictly limited to regular cult (sacrifice, theoxenia, etc.).[166] No personal intercourse with them other than "spiritual"—let alone sexual—is open to mortals. Henceforth the gods only tread upon distant and remote places. Alternatively, one may construe ἀνθρώπων *not* with ἀπό (or ἀπέχω), but with εὐνὰς καὶ ἤθεα, "the sleeping and living places of mortals." In this sense the pairing is apposite, since εὐναί connotes sex and is used with ἤθεα[167] by archaic epic to denote animal lairs and human sleeping and dwelling places.[168] χωρίς would be pleonastic for emphasis: "but so that the blessed [gods], thenceforth as before, may keep far apart the beds and dwellings of mortals."[169]

In short, lines 102–3 reveal the ultimate intention of Zeus in destroying the race of the demigods.[170] By separating mortals and immortals, he puts an

[165] Cf. Catull. 64.384–408 with Pontani 2000.

[166] Cf. Bianchi 1988 and Bruit 1989.

[167] Animal haunts: *Il.* 6.511, *Od.* 14.411, and *Op.* 525; human dwellings: *Op.* 137 (here "customs" is also possible), 167, 222.

[168] εὐνή or εὐναί for animal lairs or haunts: *Il.* 11.115, 15.580, 22.190, *Od.* 4.338, 14.14; for Typhoeus's abode: *Il.* 2.783; for bivouacs: *Il.* 10.408, 10.464; for nymphs' dwellings: *Il.* 24.615.

[169] Cf. Catull. 64.384–86: *praesentes namque ante domos invisere castas / heroum ... / caelicolae ... solebant.* For ἀπέχω used only with an accusative direct object, see *DGE* s.v. I.1. The context determines from what or whom the object is kept apart.

[170] For comparative studies of the so-called "destruction motif," see Mayer 1996 and Koenen 1994. Scodel 1982 provides an interesting analysis primarily from within Greek culture, to which she adds a few pertinent cross-cultural parallels.

end to the consorting that characterized the heroic age. We can only speculate about the aims of this separation. Epic poetry suggests that heroes, especially those who have a divine parent, cause strife among the gods and conflict between them and mortals: either gods quarrel among themselves as they seek to promote the interests of their own children or protégés over against other mortals; or heroes dare vie even with gods, especially with those who are most like them.[171] *Iliad* 16 provides the *locus classicus* of the former. Patroklos is about to slay Sarpedon and Zeus hesitates whether to save him. Hera's rebuke is telling: Sarpedon is just a mortal man (ἄνδρα θνητόν, 441) of old destined to die (πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ, 441). "Do you wish to release him from woeful death? Do it, but we, all the other gods, do not approve of it ... If you send Sarpedon home alive, take thought lest thereafter any other of the gods also wish to send his own dear son away from mighty combat; for many sons of the immortals (υἱέες ἀθανάτων, 449) are fighting around the great city of Priam, and among them you will cause dread resentment."[172] Note the expression υἱέες ἀθανάτων, which parallels the τέκνα θεῶν of fr. 204.101.

Physical proximity and social contact encourage sympathy of feeling and partiality. Homeric epic presents the gods as the privileged audience of the Trojan war. Not only does Zeus sit and watch (*Il.* 8.51–52, 11.80–83); so also do the gods in assembly (*Il.* 4.1–4). On one occasion, Apollo and Athena in the shape of vultures watch from the oak, delighting in the warriors (*Il.* 7.61). This watching clearly implies a degree of emotional involvement, and the corresponding bonds of affection cause dissension among the gods. But if ἔρις disrupts proper divine φιλότης (not necessarily sexual), my *philotēs* supplement commends its restoration. Zeus may have intended to banish once and for all from the divine assembly all strife provoked by the gods' emotional involvement with heroes. This is, at any rate, what the end of the heroic age accomplished. If so, ironically, Zeus made divine strife itself instrumental to his βουλή. With it, he fanned the flames of contention and ensured a high number of casualties. Homer draws attention to this fact in *Iliad* 20, when the gods come together at Zeus's summons and Poseidon inquires about the Διὸς ... βουλήν (15). In response, the father of gods and men makes clear that, even though he cares for the warriors (μέλουσί μοι ὀλλύμενοί περ, 21), he will remain on Olympos and delight his mind watching them die (ὁρόων φρένα τέρψομαι, 23). And he encourages the gods to join the fray on either

[171] Nagy 1999: 289–97 studies the antagonism between gods and heroes.

[172] *Il.* 16.442–49; cf. 22.174–81. Other instances of gods caring for warriors are *Il.* 8.350 (Hera for the Akhaians), and 15.12 and 22.168–73 (Zeus for Hektor).

side, for otherwise Akhilleus will soon defeat the Trojans and bring the war to a premature end (23–30). "So spoke the son of Kronos, and he roused unabating war; and the gods went to war, their hearts in two camps (δίχα θυμὸν ἔχοντες)" (32). Several passages reflect on the undercurrent of irritation among the gods at Zeus's plan (e.g., *Il.* 11.75–79). Even he is amazed at the fervor of Hera's partisanship: "How are the sons of Priam injuring you so greatly that you rage incessantly to lay waste the well-built city of Ilion? If you entered its gates and high walls and devoured Priam raw, his sons, and the rest of the Trojans, then might you appease your wrath" (*Il.* 4.31–36). Smoldering anger bursts into the flames of conflict in Book 21, and Zeus, as we expect, rejoices: "Heavy and grievous strife fell on the other gods and the heart in their breast was blown in two camps; and they fell together with a mighty clash, and the wide earth creaked, and high heaven trumpeted about. And Zeus heard, sitting on Olympos, and his dear heart laughed for joy when he saw the gods joining in strife" (385–90).

Regarding direct defiance of the gods, many examples may be cited. A particularly signal one, from the *Catalogue* itself, is the impiety of Salmoneus, whose people Zeus punished with thunder and lightning for their king's trespass, "so that no other mortal would contend with lord Zeus."[173] In Homer, mortals sometimes fight with gods and even wound them, as Diomedes does under divine incitement.[174] The list of mortals who were punished for defying the gods includes Thamyris (*Il.* 2.594–600), Lykourgos (*Il.* 6.130–40), Eurytos (*Od.* 8.223–28), and Otos and Ephialtes (*Od.* 11.308–20). As Dione notes, "not very long-lived is he who fights with the immortals, and in no wise do his children at his knees call him papa when he is come back from war and dread fighting" (*Il.* 5.407).

8. CONCLUSION

The interpretation of Hes. fr. 204.94–103 defended in this article disputes the widely held assumption that the *Catalogue* divides the population of the heroic age into demigod "hybrids" and "ordinary" humans. This anachronistic understanding distorts the poem's portrayal of the world of heroes and clashes with notions deeply rooted in archaic Greek culture by a centuries-old tradition of epic performance. This dichotomous view of the heroic age is neither

[173] ὡς μή τις] βροτὸς ἄλλος [ἐ]ρίζοι Ζηνὶ ἄνακτι (fr. 30.23 M-W). Note that Salmoneus's father is not a god, nor his mother a goddess. By the narrow definition contested in this article, he would *not* be a demigod and would fall beyond the purview of the *Catalogue*'s ostensible subject.

[174] But cf. *Il.* 6.128–29.

established by the *Catalogue*'s proem nor reflected by its fr. 204, which describes the execution of Zeus's plan to bring the age to a close. The themes this fragment weaves together emerge from my reading as deeply traditional. Given the cultural crucible in which it was forged, such traditionality is doubtless to be expected in a poem so popular and well received. At the same time, the poet displays great originality in the arrangement of his material. He identifies Helen's Hermione as the trigger of Zeus's action, and draws attention to the scope and shrewdness of Zeus's plan, which involved more than the destruction of the heroes. His aim was no less than a final separation of gods and mortals, with the restoration and restriction of φιλότης (both "amity" and "sex") to divine society. Humans would no longer cause dissension among the gods or enjoy sexual relations with them. Although the *Catalogue* emerges largely in continuity with the Homeric and the other Hesiodic poems, I have also argued that we must respect the integrity of Hesiod's non-overlapping perspectives, i.e., of alternative accounts like the Myth of Pandora and the Myth of the Ages. The attempts by scholars to harmonize such perspectives into a single narrative have only succeeded in distorting the *Catalogue*'s plan and message. In particular, the drive to situate the poem's prologue in relation to Prometheus's Mekone is responsible for infelicitous conjectures that have long burdened its interpretation. In the course of my argument, I have also suggested new supplements to lines 100-1 and 103. These underscore the uncertainties and implausibilities of long-standing proposals. They also show that it is possible to interpret the fragment without doing violence to traditional notions. Thus the *Catalogue* confirms key features of the heroic age that archaic poetry has long taught us to cherish.

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